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PERSONHOOD, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE NEW
GENETICS*
Janet L. Dolgint
INTRODUCTION
Revolutionary developments in molecular biology are alter-
ing social understandings of disease and the parameters of
medical practice in ways that promise or threaten (depending
on perspective) to alter the essential character of the social
order. Among the most striking of these developments is the
mapping of the human genome.
Decoding the human genome and identifying genetic se-
quences' may provide, among other things, for the production
of individually tailored drugs,2 for medicines without side ef-
fects,3 and perhaps eventually for gene therapy that will re-
place dysfunctional genes with genes that preclude or cure
illness." But, the same developments threaten society with the
potential for devastating biological accidents,5 with broad inva-
©2000 Janet L. Dolgin. All Rights Reserved.
Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law. BA.
(philosophy), Barnard College; M.A., Ph.D. (anthropology), Princeton University;
J.D., Yale Law School. I am grateful to Connie Lenz, Assistant Director, Maurice
A. Deane Law Library, Hofstra University School of Law, for her creative and
intelligent assistance with identifying and locating research materials.
1 In June, 2000, the Human Genome Project (a public consortium, funded
largely by the U.S. Government and including laboratories in the United States,
Britain, Japan, Germany, France, and China) and private industry (the Celera
Corporation) together announced the completion of a "first draft" of the human ge-
nome. Nicholas Wade, Reading the Book of Life: Now, the Hard Part: Putting the
Genome to Work, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at F1 [hereinafter Now, the Hard
Part]; Nicholas Wade, A Historic Quest: Double Landmarks for Watson: Helix and
Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at F5.
2 Life Story: A Survey of the Human Genome, ECONOMIST, July 1-7, 2000, at 8
[hereinafter Survey of the Human Genome].
' Now, the Hard Part, supra note 1, at F4.
Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 5.
Id. at 16.
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sions of individual and communal privacy,6 and with "genetic"
bigotry7 and the revival of eugenic policies.8
Behind the concrete promises and threats that attend the
new genetics lies another sort of change-more subtle than
those more usually, and more easily, described and assessed,
but as important. In particular, developments in molecular
biology will likely alter-and in certain contexts have already
begun to alter-the ideological frame within which people
define themselves and their actions.
This Article identifies and explores the ramifications of
one such change. This change involves a fundamental shift in
the locus of social value from the autonomous individual-long
the central agent of thought and action in most domains of
life' in the post-Enlightenment West-to a larger whole, de-
fined through the presumption of a shared genome. Among the
consequences of this change are two evolving conceptions of a
"genetic family" and a "genetic ethnic group." Each threatens
to eviscerate a set of basic values related almost exclusively to
the autonomous individual. Among those values are privacy,
equality, and choice. This Article focuses on potential conse-
quences of this shift in the locus of social value for familial and
for ethnic and racial groups.' ° The widespread availability of
' Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Genetic Privacy and the Law:
An End to Genetics Exceptionalism, 40 JURIdETRICS 21, 22 (1999) (summarizing
likely benefits and concerns about proliferation of genetic information).
'Now, the Hard Part, supra note 1, at F4.
8 Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 16.
' For most of the last two and a half centuries, the person within familial
settings has been defined in express contrast with the person in the marketplace.
See, e.g., JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRO-
DUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 1-6 (1997). So, for instance, society has understood
the family as a hierarchical, holistic social unit, defined by enduring solidarity.
See, e.g., DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 51-52
(1968). In the last few decades of the twentieth century, new understandings of
the domestic arena competed openly with old ones. Society and the law now often
treat the person within family settings as an autonomous individual who has cho-
sen to relate to others as family. See generally KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE
CHOOSE: LESBIANS, GAYS, KINSHIP (1991); see also infra notes 318-322 and accom-
panying text (distinguishing notion of traditional family from notion of family-by-
choice).
'0 As used in this Article, the difference between the terms "ethnic" and "ra-
cial" refers to a social, not a genetic, or other sort of biological, difference. In the
United States, the difference between race and ethnicity lies in the consistency
and force with which members of a group are excluded from mainstream society
and its benefits. See, e.g., JANET L. DOLGIN, JEWISH IDENTITY AND THE JDL 145
[Vol. 66: 3
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genetic information may create, and appear to validate, nega-
tive images of groups defined through reference to DNA and
alter understandings of personhood that now prompt the law
to protect privacy, and to prohibit ethnic and racial discrimina-
tion.
The implications of the new genetics for Ashkenazi Jews"
shows the consequences of genetic information for those identi-
fied with groups long characterized through somatic traits.'
The Jewish case is especially illuminating because of the dis-
proportionate research attention that has, in recent years, been
devoted to studying the genome of Ashkenazi Jews, 3 the con-
sequent identification of genetic alterations associated with
Ashkenazi Jews, and the long history of stigmatization and
discrimination that Jews have endured as a religious group, a
racial group, an ethnic group, and a national group.'4 The
new genetics provides a new sort of data ("genetic informa-
tion") and a new frame for interpreting such data that pose a
series of interconnected dangers (of discrimination and stig-
matization") to Jewish communities, as well as to other com-
munities that have been defined, or that can be defined, in
"genetic" terms.
At least some of these dangers are especially disturbing
because it is not likely that American law, as presently consti-
(1977) (considering difference between "race" and "ethnicity" in context of social
scientists' use of scaled attributes to compare groups). In the American context,
African-Americans have been treated as a "race" more consistently and more
harshly than other groups.
This Article generally uses the term "ethnic" group, rather than the more
cumbersome term "ethnic/racial" group. It is, however, important to remember that
the dangers of social discrimination against a group by mainstream society are
more likely to affect groups defined in racial, rather than ethnic, terms.
" The term Ashkenazi Jew refers to Jews from Europe and Russia. About
eighty-two percent of the world's Jewish population is of Ashkenazi origin. Howard
Markel, Di Goldene Medina (the Golden Land): Historical Perspectives of Eugenics
and the East European (Ashkenazi) Jewish-American Community, 1880-1925, 7
HEALTH MATRIX 49, 50 (1997).
12 Other cases could be described. See infra notes 182-190 (considering case of
African-Americans).
13 See infra notes 203 & 212 and accompanying text (noting reasons for this
attention to genetic information of Ashkenazi Jews).
14 See, e.g., LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA xix 58 (1994); see
also infra notes 224-243 and accompanying text (describing stigmatization of Jew-
ish communities in the West from middle ages to present).
1" See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (defining and differentiating
between "discrimination" and "stigmatization").
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tuted, will provide adequate protection against such dangers.
Since the legal system has not been able to devise a consistent,
comprehensive approach to genetic discrimination, it will prob-
ably prove unable to limit stigmatization against groups identi-
fied on the basis of genetic information.
This Article begins by reviewing developments in molecu-
lar biology that have resulted in the growing proliferation of
genetic information. Part II describes an ideology of "genetic
inheritance," developing as the social implications of the new
genetics are digested and internalized by the society, and then
reviews the responses of the law to discriminatory uses of
genetic information. Finally, Part III presents and analyzes
some potential consequences of an ideology of genetic inheri-
tance for ethnic and racial groups in the United States. In
part, the argument in this Part relies on evidence about the
implications of the concept of the "genetic family" and on an
analogy, long internalized within the culture, between familial
and ethnic settings. Within both contexts, people have long
defined "Self' and "Other" through the metaphors of blood.
Further, Part III denotes and considers a remarkable assump-
tion that underlies a recent state court decision and several
law review commentaries-that in certain contexts autono-
mous individuals are being replaced by a larger, genetic whole.
That process directly threatens many of the rights protected by
the Bill of Rights insofar as those rights depend on, because
they attach to, the individual person and not larger groups.
Emerging visions of that larger whole displace the notion of
the autonomous individual, and thus preclude, or at least limit,
the very concept of choice as that concept has developed in the
West since the Enlightenment.
I. THE "NEw GENETIcs"
In molecular biology, the twentieth century became the.
age of information. Indeed, biology is fast becoming an "infor-
mation" science. 6 Geneticists now work in silica-on comput-
ers-as well as directly on living matter. 7 Moreover, DNA,'8
Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 6.
17 Id.
18 The full name for these molecules is deoxyribonucleic acid. In 1944, research-
[Vol. 66:3
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the molecules on which genes are "written," is viewed as im-
portant insofar as it provides information-messages presented
in a "code of chemicals." 9 Many hypotheses are being formu-
lated and a great deal of debate results as scientists attempt to
discern the limits of that code for the physical and psychologi-
cal state of humanity. In June, 2000, the federally-funded "Hu-
man Genome Project"2 ' and private industry2' together an-
nounced the completion of a preliminary draft of the so-called
"human genome." 2' That draft provides a transcript of encod-
ed DNA. The accomplishment is remarkable. However, compar-
atively little is yet known about the complicated implications
of the genetic code.' Scientists have identified about ninety-
seven percent of the bits of information on the DNA molecule,
but the bits have not all been placed in order, and scientists do
not know what most of the bits "say."
24
ers at the Rockefeller Institute realized that genes are made of DNA. The struc-
ture of the DNA molecule was discerned in 1953 by James D. Watson and Francis
Crick, helped by the work of Rosalind Franklin and Maurice Willkins. Reading the
Book of Life: What Lies Ahead: Journey to the Genome, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000,
at F4.
19 MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS
13 (1999).
20 See supra note 1 (defining Human Genome Project).
21 Dr. J. Craig Venter, President of Celera Genomics of Maryland, and Dr.
Francis S. Collins, Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute,
participated with President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair (who partici-
pated by satellite) in announcing the completion of a preliminary draft of the
human genome. Jeff Nesmith, Genetic Code Map a Milestone: But Hurdles Remain
to Conquer Disease, ATLANTA J. & CONSTITUTION, June 27, 2000, at 1A, available
at Lexis, News Library, Georgia New Sources File; Nicholas Wade, Reading the
Book of Life: The Overview: Genetic Code of Human Life is Cracked by Scientists,
N.Y. TnIES, June 27, 2000, at Al.
Results of the $300 billion effort of the Human Genome Project have been
posted on the Internet. Information is updated twice a day. Nesmith, supra, at 1A.
22 Molecular biologist Lee Silver defines the "human genome" as the genetic in-
formation contained on humans' twenty-three pairs of chromosomes. Lee M. Silver,
The Meaning of Genes and "Genetic Rights," 40 JURIMETRICS 9, 13 (1999). The
human genome is a statistical construct that is said to reflect the DNA in human
cells. Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 3. The people whose DNA
was actually sequenced by the Human Genome Project and by Celera remain
anonymous. Nicholas Wade, Reading the Book of Life: Tools Already in Use: Whose
DNA Is It? In a Way, Nobody's, N.Y. TIMEES, June 27, 2000, at F2.
2 Now the Hard Part, supra note 1, at F4 ("Biologists face years of prepara-
tory work in understanding the various levels of the genome's operation.").
2 Nesmith, supra note 21, at 1A, Human Genome: Scientists Celebrate 'Working
Copy' of Map, AAMERICAN HEALTH LINE, June 27, 2000, available at Lexis, News
Library, Georgia News Sources File [hereinafter Scientists Celebrate].
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The task of deciphering the code's meaning is made diffi-
cult by, among other things, the absence of "punctuation" on
DNA, which might indicate where one gene ends and another
starts." Moreover, genes compose a small part of any chromo-
some.26 It is widely assumed that much of the rest of the DNA
molecule is "junk."27 The portions of DNA that are not genes
may, however, prove essential to cell function. Understand-
ing the decoded genome depends on differentiating meaningful
genes from other sequences that lie between the genes on the
chromosome.29
Even the number of genes that comprise the human ge-
nome remains in question; it is not yet known where all the
genes begin and end because of the large areas on the DNA
molecule that "interrupt" the coded genetic information. 0 Sci-
entists now estimate that the human genome contains about
50,000 discrete genes.3 Any one gene may encode several pro-
teins.32 Moreover, genes interact in complicated ways, so that
Now the Hard Part, supra note 1, at F4.
26 Deconstructing a Chromosome, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at F6.
27 Scientists Celebrate, supra note 24. Matt Ridley defines this "junk DNA" as
'a jumble of repetitive or random sequences that [are] rarely or never transcribed."
RIDLEY, supra note 19, at 9.
28 MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME: THE
CHALLENGE TO EQUALITY 11 (1998). Mehlman and Botkin suggest that "junk" DNA
may also or alternatively prove to have been important during the evolutionary
process. Id.
29 The parts of the chromosome between the genes, called introns, are not
copied by the cell when it translates the gene's code to create a protein.
Deconstructing a Chromosome, supra note 26, at F6.
30 RIDLEY, supra note 19, at 6. The interruptions are called introns. See supra
note 29.
" David Baltimore, Mapping Genes a Start, Not an End, SEAT1LE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, June 27, 2000, at A13, available at Lexis, News Library, Wash-
ington News Sources File. Flies have about 14,000 genes and worms about 18,000.
Id. In June, 2000, some researchers believed that the human genome may contain
as few as 30,000 to 38,000 genes; others believe the number may be closer to
120,000, or even 150,000 genes. Scientists Celebrate, supra note 24; Survey of the
Human Genome, supra note 2, at 6. By February, 2001, scientists at both Celera
Genomics and at the public Human Genome Project had concluded that humans
only have about 30,000 genes. Nicholas Wade, Genome Analysis Shows Humans
Survive on Low Number of Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at Al. Scientists at
the Human Genome Project estimate the number to be between 30,000 and
35,000. Id. Scientists at Celera Genomics estimate that humans have 26,500 genes.
Chris Adams, Rival Genome Researchers Give Glimpse of Findings, Commend Par-
allel Effort, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2001, at B6.
32 Baltimore, supra note 31, at A13.
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a particular illness or condition may result not simply from one
or two genetic alterations, but from an interplay of a variety of
genes and environmental factors.33
Genetic information can be used, and has been used, to
suggest that people are essentially homogeneous or to stress
differences among them. Humans share 99.9 percent of their
genetic information.34 However, the differences among peo-
ple-the so called genetic alterations-are the focus of a great
deal of medical and scientific work." People do not differ in
the genes on their chromosomes; they do, however, differ in
having alternative forms of genes (called alleles).36 These alle-
lic differences are at the heart of research aimed at establish-
ing correlations between genes and illnesses (and other physi-
cal and psychological characteristics). Moreover, not all genetic
alterations are inherited, but those that are occur in every cell
of a person's body.37
Certain genetic alterations (sometimes referred to as "mu-
tations")" lead to, or predispose people to, illness. Human
chromosomes, totaling forty-six in all, occur in pairs; half come
from the egg, half from the sperm. Sometimes, illness associat-
ed with a genetic alteration will occur only if the alteration is
inherited from both parents. Such illnesses, including, for in-
stance, sickle-cell anemia, are termed "recessive."3 Those
with a recessive genetic alteration on only one arm, rather
than on both arms, of a chromosome pair will not become ill
but may pass the alteration on to offspring. Other hereditary
conditions may become manifest if the relevant altered gene is
inherited from only one parent. Huntington's disease, for in-
stance, is such a dominantly inherited condition.
' Erica Goode, Most Ills Are a Matter of More Than One Gene, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2000, at F1, F6.
" Silver, supra note 22, at 13. Among the surprises of the Genome Project was
discovering how closely related most animals and plants are to each other from a
genetic perspective. Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 8.
" Now the Hard Part, supra note 1, at F4 (noting that biologists will now
attempt "to track the major variants in DNA sequence found in the human popu-
lation").
'6 Silver, supra note 22, at 13.
MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 28, at 12 (stating that genes can be altered
by errors in copying, by radiation, and by other external factors).
: Id. at 12.
29 Id.
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Certain diseases correlated with genetic alterations do not
occur in the absence of the relevant genetic alteration. Exam-
ples include Huntington's disease and sickle-cell anemia. The
etiology of other hereditary conditions is more complicated. For
example, several genetic alterations that predispose people to
breast cancer have been identified. If a woman tests positive
for one of them-for instance, for the so-called BRCA1 gene-it
is estimated that she has a fifty-six percent lifetime risk of
becoming ill with breast cancer." However, no guarantees can
be provided to women who test negative for genetic alterations
associated with breast cancer. Genetic alterations, not yet
identified, may be associated with the illness. In addition, a
wide set of non-genetic factors influences whether a woman
becomes ill with breast cancer.4'
Apparently more complicated, and far more murky, is the
relation between genetic alterations and behavior.42 Even ef-
forts that have focused on discrete psychiatric disorders have
failed to locate genes associated with those conditions.43 For
example, researchers have announced the identification of
genetic alterations associated with manic-depressive disorder
or schizophrenia." But subsequent evidence has undermined
early claims.45 Proposed correlations between genetic alter-
ations and behavior,46 or between the human genome and
"human nature," are less certain still.4"
"' Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic Medicine,
and Managed Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 855 (1999). BRCA1 is located
on chromosome 17. The second genetic alteration found to be associated with
breast cancer is located on chromosome 13. RmDLEY, supra note 19, at 190.
41 Freya R. Schnabel, Breast Cancer: What the History Can Tell You About
Risk-and What You Can Tell Your Patient, 38 CONSULTANT 2083, Sept. 1, 1998,
available at Lexis, News Library, Allnews File (delineating major risk factors for
breast cancer, which include age, gender, diet, exposure to environmental factors,
and genetic factors).
42 Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 13.
Goode, supra note 33, at Fl. Alzheimer's is the only psychiatric disorder
with which a genetic alteration has yet been associated. Id.
44 Id.
41 Id. For more information on genetic alterations, see generally RIDLEY, supra
note 19.
4' Goode, supra note 33, at Fl.
" See Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 13.
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II. SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND LEGAL RESPONSES
The decoding of the human genome has answered only a
small number of the questions being asked about the specific
role that genetics plays in causing disease and deformity, and
even fewer of the questions being asked about the implications
of genetics for behavior and social life. It has nonetheless em-
powered an ideology of genetic inheritance in terms of which
people (it is hoped or feared) can be measured.48 That ideology
challenges familiar understandings of gender, race, history,
relationships, illness, responsibility, blame,49  and
personhood." Elements of that ideology have long been re-
flected in cultural understandings of the role of "nature" in
determining physical and emotional states, and more specifi-
cally, in the eugenics movement that flourished in the United
States and in Western Europe in the first half of the twentieth
century." As interpretations of work in molecular biology be-
gin to suggest links between specific genetic alterations on the
one hand, and physical characteristics, spiritual and mental
states, and particular diseases, on the other, an ideology pre-
mised on genetic inheritance again becomes significant in
American culture. But the dynamic once presumed to explain
human affairs, the balance between the forces of nature and
nurture, has shifted.52
"' I am grateful to Kaja Finkler for the term "ideology of genetic inheritance"
to describe the assumptions that attend the appropriation and elaboration of the
new genetics within society. KAJA FINKLER, EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS:
FAMILY AND KINSHIP ON THE MEDICAL FRONTIER IX (2000) (introducing notion of
ideology of genetic inheritance to describe people's "conceptualizations of familial
inheritance of disease").
"1 DOROTHY NELKIN & SUSAN LINDEE, THE DNA MYSTIQUE: THE GENE AS A
CULTURAL ICON 18, 127-48 (1995). Nelkin and Lindee suggest that if social prob-
lems, such as violence, are viewed as products of DNA, then society, and govern-
ment in particular, are absolved of responsibility for such conditions. Id. at 129.
" See infra notes 254-259 and accompanying text (delineating implications of
ideology of genetic inheritance for notions of personhood).
" See, e.g., KENNETH M. LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: A HIS-
TORICAL APPRAISAL 7-43 (1972) (summarizing history of American Eugenics Move-
ments from 1905 to 1930).
" See, e.g., Jeff Nesmith, Human Gene Puzzle Solved: Scientists Say They've
Decoded Mother, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 27, 2000, at Al, available at
Lexis, Current File (reporting first announcement of decoding of human genome in
June 2000, and noting scientists' predictions of longer, healthier life; also quoting
James Watson's comparison of decoding of genome to invention of printing press
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Increasingly, society focuses on information about nature
(and especially about genetics)53 in understanding history, in
explaining contemporary social patterns, and in predicting the
future.' The apparent role of nurture, in balancing and mold-
ing nature, dims. Genetic information is venerated as a source
of indubitable truths about people and about society." Only a
month after the announcement that geneticists had "mapped"
the human genome," an essay by Andrew Sullivan in the
New York Times Sunday Magazine proclaimed that "genetic
discrimination, however troubling, is both rational and inevita-
ble. And the sooner we get over our handwringing, the bet-
ter."57 Indeed, genetic information is being used by doctors to
diagnose disease, suggest treatment options, and assess prog-
noses. It is also being used by insurers, anxious to minimize
and proclaiming, "Now, let's print some books").
' Karen Rothenberg presents a definition of "genetic information" jointly devel-
oped by the National Action Plan on Breast Cancer and the National Institutes of
Health Department of Energy. Those groups defined "genetic information" as "in-
formation about genes, gene products, or inherited characteristics that may derive
from the individual or a family member.' See Karen Rothenberg et al., Genetic
Information and the Workplace: Legislative Approaches and Policy Challenges, 275
SCIENCE 1755, 1755, 1757 n.20 (1997). State statutes define "genetic information"
variously. For instance, Texas prohibits discriminatory uses of genetic information,
but the statute does not apply to information obtained through medical histories.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9031 (Vernon 1999).
Matt Ridley approvingly describes this new focus:
Rich Harris has systematically demolished the dogma that has lain un-
challenged, beneath twentieth-century social science: the assumption that
parents shape the personality and culture of their children. In Sigmund
Freud's psychology, John Watson's behaviourism and Margaret Mead's
anthropology, nurture-determinism by parents was never tested, only
assumed. Yet the evidence from twin studies, from the children of immi-
grants and from adoption studies, is not staring us in the face: people
get their personalities from their genes and from their peers, not from
their parents.
RIDLEY, supra note 19, at 305-06 (citing RICH J. HARRIS, THE NURTURE ASSUMP-
TION (1998)).
Ridley, himself, claims that determinism is the product of nature and nurture;
however, that claim is belied by the explanation Ridley provides. "Freedom," writes
Ridley, "lies in expressing your own determinism, not somebody else's. It is not
the determinism that makes a difference, but the ownership .... Part of our
revulsion at cloning originates in the fear that what is uniquely ours could be
shared by another." Id. at 313.
55 See, e.g., NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 49, at 3.
56 See Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 8.
5 Andrew Sullivan, Counter Culture: Promotion of the Fittest, N.Y. TIMES MAG-
AZINE, July 23, 2000, at 16.
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coverage risks; by employers, concerned about hiring someone
likely to become ill in certain workplace environments or, in
general, by social service agencies, deciding whether to approve
or disapprove an adoption; by' educators, placing students in
various tracks and programs; and by prison boards, consider-
ing parole applications." And genetic information can be
used, and is being used, to stigmatize people and groups with
which they are associated. Genetic information can not only
facilitate what Sullivan calls "rational" discrimination, it can
also encourage pernicious stigmatization.
All of these uses of genetic information raise concerns
about protecting genetic privacy and precluding discrimination
based on genetic information. Lawmakers and social critics
have begun to respond to these concerns.59 But the results of
the law's response remain inconsistent and inadequate. And
that is likely to remain the case, because it is unlikely that the
legal system can respond effectively to the production of stig-
matizing images aimed at particular people or groups-images
that, once constructed, can be widely generalized in society.
58 The American Medical Association has delineated twelve groups, outside the
world of health care, who seek medical records. Such records may include genetic
information. JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, PRIVACY FOR SALE: How COMPUTERIZATION HAS
MADE EVERYONE'S LIFE AN OPEN SECRET 180 (1992).
"' See, e.g., Dina Davis, Groups, Communities and Contested Identities in Ge-
netic Research, 30 HAST. CENT. REP. 38 (2000); Jason Kaar, Genetic Data, Privacy,
and Discrimination, 2000 INTL LEG. PRACTITIONER 128 (2000); Aeikko Launis, The
Use of Genetic Test Information in Insurance: The Argument from
Indistinguishability Reconsidered, 6 SC. & ENGINEERING ETHICS 299 (2000).
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A. The Ideology of Genetic Inheritance'
The notion that people are their genes predates the new
genetics and the Human Genome Project. In Western culture,
the notion has long been reflected, among other places, in
social understandings of kinship6' and in popular claims
about intelligence and criminality.62 It was institutionalized
in the eugenics movements that developed in the United
States, Germany, and Britain in the first few decades of the
twentieth century.63 Especially before World War I, a signifi-
cant number of geneticists, and, ironically, social progres-
sives, 4 participated enthusiastically in the eugenics move-
ment.65 However, institutionalized medicine largely ignored
both eugenics and the science of genetics.' By the 1920s, as
many eugenicists became expressly racist,67 geneticists began
' See supra note 48 (summarizing Kaja Finkler's use of term "ideology of
genetic inheritance"). As used in this Article, the term "ideology" refers to the
underlying, often pervasive beliefs in terms of which people understand and act in
the world. Janet L. Dolgin & JoAnn Magdoff, The Invisible Event, in SYMBOLIC
ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER IN THE STUDY OF SYMBOLS AND MEANINGS 363 n.7
(Janet L. Dolgin et al. eds., 1977). The definition follows that of the French
Indologist Louis Dumont. Dumont wrote:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a
distinction of matter but one of point of view. We do not take as
ideological what is left out when everything that is socially thought,
believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it is a living whole, the
interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts would be blocked out
by the a priori introduction of our current dichotomies.
LOUIS DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE To MARX: THE GENESIS AND TRIUMPH OF
ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY 22 (1977).
6" In 1968, the anthropologist David M. Schneider provided a cultural account
of American kinship. See generally SCHNEIDER, supra note 9. For Americans, he
explained, "[k]inship is the blood relationship, the fact of shared biogenetic sub-
stance." SCHNEIDER, supra note 9, at 107.
62 See LUDMERER, supra note 51, at 77 (describing development in the United
States at turn of twentieth century of myth about the "menace of the feeblemind-
ed"; the myth was supported through popularization of studies of "criminal" and
"immoral" families).
' Gail Rodgers, Comment, Yin and Yang: The Eugenic Policies of the United
States and China: Is the Analysis that Black and White?, 22 HOUS. J. INTL L.
129, 133 (1999).
Ironically, many eugenicists believed themselves progressive reformers.
LUDMERER, supra note 51, at 16. Some of these urged, for instance, that the "pow-
er" of politicians would better be replaced by the "wisdom" of technologists. Id. at
17 (quoting ALBERT E. WIGGAM, THE NEW DECALOGUE OF SCIENCE 277 (1923).
6 Id. at 34-35.
6 Id. at 63-73.
67 Early on, a group of eugenicists, especially those associated with the Eugen-
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to openly disclaim the movement."
In the decades immediately following World War II, Amer-
ican society began to favor explanations of behavior and of
relationships among people based on cultural, rather than
natural, factors-socialization, education, and choice over bio-
logical determinism." Even Freudian psychology-which
gained popular prominence in the 1950s and 1960s and which
explains human thought and action as determined (indeed, as
"over-determined"7 )-argues that human behavior is deter-
mined primarily by personal history and familial interac-
tions.7
But by the last two decades of the twentieth century, so-
cial explanations of behavior and descriptions of personhood
outside familial contexts began increasingly to be focused on
biological (natural) phenomena. 2 By this time, remarkable
advances in molecular biology were being widely reported in
professional journals and in the popular media." Other scien-
tists and social scientists quickly took note. So, for instance,
psychologists began to suggest that genetic alterations may
explain shyness, intelligence, religiosity, and character traits
apparently more amorphous:
ics Record Office at Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, supported legislation limit-
ing immigration from southern and eastern Europe. These efforts played a part in
the promulgation of the Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 (the Johnson Act),
Ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (repealed 1952). LUDMERER, supra note 51, at 7, 25-27, 89.
, LUDMERER, supra note 51, at 121-34.
" R.C. Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Leon J. Kamin note that "the contrast be-
tween biological and cultural determinisms is a manifestation of the nature-nur-
ture controversy that has plagued biology, psychology, and sociology since the early
part of the nineteenth century. R.C. LEWONTIN ET AL., NOT IN OUR GENES: BIOLO-
GY, IDEOLOGY AND HUMAN NATURE 267 (1984). They argue that the dichotomy
between nature and nurture should be abandoned. They suggest that
"interactionism"-the notion that organisms are determined through an interaction
between environment and genes--"is the beginning of wisdom." Id. at 268.
70 SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREA is 340-44 (James Strackey
trans. 1965, 8th ed. 1930).
7 The project of Freud's great magnum opus, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS,
was to demonstrate the connection between the conscious and the unconscious di-
mensions of the mind and to locate the complicated, often apparently incoherent
churning of the unconscious mind, in the events of early life. See generally FREUD,
supra note 70.
72 FINKLER, supra note 48, at 14.
73 Id. at 1.
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The Minnesota Center for Twin and Adoption Research has provided
percentage estimates of the extent to which certain personality
traits are determined by heredity: extroversion, sixty-one percent;
conformity, sixty percent; tendency to worry, fifty-five percent; cre-
ativity, fifty-five percent; aggressiveness, forty-eight percent. While
human genome research has been promoted as a way to find disease
genes, many within the scientific community believe that a map of
the genome will also document the inheritance of these complex,
socially important human traits.74
Jeremy Rifkin reports other, similar examples. In 1996,
one group of researchers claimed that they had evidence sug-
gesting a "genetic basis for 'novelty seeking,' 'thrill seeking,'
and 'excitability.' "' Researchers at the National Institutes of
Health reported evidence of a gene that predisposes people to
worry. 6 And still other researchers, investigating genetic fac-
tors in relationships among family members, suggest that such
factors affect the character of relationships between siblings
and between parents and their children.77
In 1984, Lewontin, Rose, and Kamin explained why social
theories grounded in biological determinism were more compel-
ling than approaches that focus on both the roles of nature and
of nurture in personal and social life.7" Rejecting "cultural
determinism" along with "biological determinism," 9 these au-
thors viewed the "nature-nurture controversy" as having
"plagued biology, psychology, and sociology since the early part
of the nineteenth century." ° Yet, they explained, biological
determinism offers something that cultural determinism seems
to lack:
We [neither biological determinists nor cultural determinists] are at
a severe disadvantage. Unlike the biological determinists who have
simple, even simplistic, views of the bases and forms of human exis-
tence, we do not pretend to know what is a correct description of all
74 NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 49, at 9 (citation omitted).
71 JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY 150 (1998).
76 Id.
71 Id. at 152. Jeremy Rifkin notes that understanding relationships among kin
through reference to genetic models transforms virtually all familiar understand-
ings of the domestic arena. Id. at 152-53; see also DOLGIN, supra note 9, at 558-65
(describing construct of the "genetic family").
78 LEWONTIN ET AL., supra note 69, at 265-70.
79 Id. at 10-11.
80 Id. at 267.
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human societies, nor can we explain all criminal behavior, wars,
family organization, and property relations as manifestations of one
simple mechanism. Rather, our view is that the relation between
gene, environment, organism, and society is complex ......
For the moment at least, the pleas of Lewontin, Rose,
Kamin, and others like them, are largely disregarded. We have
entered what Kaja Finkler describes as the age of the "hegemo-
ny of the gene." 2 At the center of the ideology of genetic in-
heritance, as it is developing in American culture, support in-
tensifies for a vision of genetic essentialism that reduces
personhood to DNA molecules. The ideological consequences
are startling. Genetic data are amoral.' Genes are not, per
se, good or bad. Alone, they suggest nothing about the proper
scope of personhood or of social relationships. To the extent
that people, and social relationships among people, are under-
stood as the consequence of genetic data, neither those people
nor their relationships can be guided by moral exhortation or
judged through reference to a moral framework. Notions of
responsibility become insignificant to a society committed
broadly to an ideology of genetic inheritance.' Every-
thing-relationships, judgments, religion, history--even time
itself-is reduced to mapped sequences of DNA.85
8' Id. at 266.
82 FINKLER, supra note 48, at 3.
' Genetic data are "a-moral," much as earthquakes or hurricanes lack a moral
frame. Just as people are generally not considered responsible for the consequences
of earthquakes or hurricanes, so they are not considered responsible for their be-
havior, their health, or their states of mind if these can be explained through
reference to genetic information.
84 See FINKLER, supra note 48, at 48. In a universe committed to an ideology
of genetic inheritance, explains Finkler:
[E]verything about an organism's existence is predetermined and geneti-
cally programmed, including its variation, although geneticists recognize
that the program may be affected by unknown and external factors in
the environment, chance, or human manipulation. The sequence of our
DNA reveals to us who and what we are; that is, what it means to be
human. With DNA sequencing, some scientists have maintained that the
riddle of life is close to being solved.
Id. (citations omitted).
8" Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald described the Human Genome Project as
"reductionism at its most extreme." RUTH HUBBARD & ELIJAH WALD, EXPLODING
THE GENE MYTH: How GENETIC INFORMATION IS PRODUCED AND MANIPULATED BY
SCIENTISTS, PHYSICIANS, EMPLOYERS, INSURANCE COMPANIES, EDUCATORS AND LAW
ENFORCERS 3 (1993). "[Glenome scientists," they explain, "will be constructing a
hypothetical sequence of submicroscopic pieces of DNA molecules, and will then
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More specifically, an understanding of personhood that has
long been assumed by Western culture is challenged by the
construct of the "genome" that has attended the development
of the Human Genome Project.86 The notion of a "human ge-
nome," against which all people are assessed, displaces the
central values (particularly liberty and equality) of the post-
Enlightenment West-including, perhaps most importantly,
the value of autonomous individuality.
An ideology based on the notion of a "human genome"
replaces the individual, as the essential unit of social value,
with that of the group. More accurately, from within such an
ideology, genetic groups (families, ethnic groups, racial
groups)87 are viewed as replicating their units. Moreover, each
unit is viewed as replicating every other unit. Neither the
group nor the individual is ultimately privileged. Either can be
identified88 and defined through reference to the genome of
the other.
The potential for genetic discrimination in the shift from
individual to "genome" is clear and has been widely discussed
and analyzed by lawmakers and by society generally.89 For
declare that sequence to be the essence of humanity." Id.
86 See supra Part I.
For the most part, this Article uses one term--"ethnic"-in place of "eth-
nicracial." Only when it seems especially important to stress the difference be-
tween "ethnic" and "racial" denominations of groups will the term "racial" be used.
See supra note 10 (distinguishing between meaning of "ethnic" and "racial" in
American context).
" Karen Lebacqz refers to one practical consequence. In 1989, during Senate
hearings, Senator Pressler asked Francis Watson, the first head of the Human
Genome Project, "If one wanted to determine the parentage of welfare children or
something of that sort in certain instances, how accurate is DNA to determine a
father of a child?" Watson replied, "Totally accurate." Karen Lebacqz, Genetic Pri-
vacy: No Deal for the Poor, in GENETICS: ISSUES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 247 (Ted Pe-
ters ed., 1998) (citing Hearing before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology and
Space of the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong. 51
(1998) (statements of Senator Pressler and Francis Watson)).
89 See generally Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Consequence of
Genetic Testing, 50 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 476 (1992); Lawrence 0. Gostin, Genetic
Discrimination: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by
Employers and Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109 (1991); Eric Mills Holmes, Solv-
ing the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Dilemma in Light of the
Human Genome Project 85 KY. L.J. 503 (1997); Tara L. Rachinsky, Genetic Test-
ing: Toward a Comprehensive Policy to Prevent Genetic Discrimination in the
Workplace, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPLOYMENT L. 575 (2000); Michael S. Yesley,
Protecting Genetic Difference, 13 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 653 (1998); Richard A.
[Vol. 66: 3
20001 PERSONHOOD, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE NEW GENETICS 771
instance, an individual belonging, or assumed to belong, to a
particular familial or ethnic group may be identified as being
at risk for a particular disease because the mapped genome of
the group with which the individual is associated includes a
gene linked with the disease in question. Conversely, members
of a "genetic group" may all be identified as being at risk for a
disease because individuals belonging to the group are known
to suffer from the disease in question. The potential for genetic
stigmatization-for the creation of negative images not ex-
pressly connected with practical ends, such as those of employ-
ers or insurers-is equally clear, but has been studied less
widely 0
B. Genetic Discrimination and Stigmatization
Larry Gostin has defined "genetic discrimination" as "the
denial of rights, privileges or opportunities on the basis of
information obtained from genetically-based diagnostic and
prognostic tests."' This Article defines the term to include, as
well, such denials on the basis of assumptions stemming from
family histories (whether elicited in health care or in other
contexts) as well as from ethnic group identification. In this
regard, genetic discrimination merges with genetic stigmatiza-
tion. This second concept involves the construction of deroga-
tory images about a group through reference to genetic infor-
mation associated with the group. In practice, genetic discrimi-
nation and genetic stigmatization merge. Historically, discrimi-
nation has been one consequence of stigmatization.92 Groups
Bornstein, Note & Comment, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Legislation:
A Closing of the Legal Loopholes, 4 J.L. & POLY 551 (1996); Jeremy A. Colby,
Note & Comment, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation Proposed by
the 105th Congress, 24 AMI. J.L. & MED. 443 (1998). These are a small sample of
the articles published only in law reviews or in law-related journals since the
early 1990s.
90 But see generally The Fifth Legal Health Law Symposium: Communities of
Color and Genetic Testing, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 887 (1997) (including articles
by, among others, Lori B. Andrews, James E. Bowman, Lisa C. Ikemoto, and Car-
ol Lee).
, Gostin, supra note 89, at 110.
92 Margaret Lock, Genetic Diversity and the Politics of Difference, 75 CHI.-KENT
L. REv. 83, 85-86 (1999) (citation omitted) (noting origin of concept of "race" in
eighteenth century and possible use of concept of race in association with "the
development of the capitalist economy and global expansion by entrepreneurs,
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stigmatized through dehumanizing images, and thus viewed as
physically and mentally marginal, have often been subjected to
discrimination in a variety of social contexts, and have thus
been precluded from participating in mainstream society.
Moreover, mainstream society has often created stigmatizing
images of groups and used them to institutionalize discrimina-
tion. In theory, stigmatizing images and derogatory speech can
be distinguished from discriminatory acts that preclude those
targeted from enjoying society's social and economic benefits.
In fact, stigmatization and discrimination are intertwined,
cause and effect merge, and it is difficult to distinguish abso-
lutely prejudicial images from discriminatory acts.
Genetic information can be employed in the service of both
discrimination and stigmatization. People may, for instance, be
rejected for jobs or for insurance coverage because they have
tested positive for a harmful genetic alteration, and are thus
thought to pose an unacceptable financial burden for an em-
ployer or insurer.93 And, people, individually and in groups,
may be imagined as physically or mentally flawed on the basis
of genetic information, whether or not they are, in fact, de-
prived of social benefits as a result.94 The differences between
discrimination and stigmatization, as here differentiated, are
particularly important in considering the ability of the law to
control or limit inappropriate uses of genetic information. For
the most part, American law is more effective at, and more
concerned with, prohibiting express acts of discrimination than
instances of stigmatization. And thus, in contexts involving
particularly with the slave trade and the arrival of a substantial number of Euro-
peans in North Africa, followed by the subjugation of the indigenous peoples").
' The case of Terri Seargent is illustrative. Ms. Seargent was dismissed from
her job because of the expenses associated with her medical condition (a genetic
defect resulting in an enzymatic deficiency that causes difficulty breathing). See
Kaar, supra note 60, at 131.
g' See infra notes 209-220 and accompanying text.
" See David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy, the Principle of Free
Speech, and the Politics of Identity, 74 C0I.-KENT L. REV. 779, 803 (1999) (refer-
ring to group libel laws--"[l]aws making it a criminal or civil wrong to engage in
defamation of racial, ethnic, or religious groups"-as "constitutionally suspect").
Richards notes that constitutional rulings "suggest that group libel statutes direct-
ed against the expression of false racial or religious stereotypes, as such, would
be . . . similarly unconstitutional." He refers, for support, to Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding unconstitutional subversive advocacy statutes "applied
to speech fomenting racial and religious hatred and bigotry") and R.AV. v. City of
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genetic information, the law has begun to respond to the threat
of discrimination. It has remained, and perhaps should remain,
largely silent with regard to genetic stigmatization. So, for
instance, Professor David Richards argues in a somewhat dif-
ferent context that the stigmatizing evils of prejudicial speech
and image-making can be combated more effectively by politi-
cal action, including what Richards calls "cultural politics,"
than by laws that expressly prohibit speech that stigmatizes
social groups."
Thus, the discussion in this Section of the law's responses
to the use of genetic information focuses on instances and
potential instances of genetic discrimination, especially in
employment and insurance contexts. However, many of the
cases of discrimination considered here stem from, and can
lead to, stigmatizing images of the people or groups involved.
The use of genetic information to construct such prejudicial,
stigmatizing images is considered in Part III.
In the United States, most reported instances of genetic
discrimination have involved insurers or employers." But
such discrimination has occurred or might occur in a variety of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance that
banned public display of symbols that suggested bias against religious, racial, or
gender groups), among other cases. Id. at 803, n.84.
6 See Richards, supra note 95, at 811 (connecting group libel laws with cre-
ation of "a kind of orthodoxy of appropriate tribalization in the terms of public
discourse"). Professor Richards thus defends the position that laws prohibiting
group libel should not survive the constitutional protections of free speech. Rich-
ards concludes:
American free speech law undoubtedly has its grave critical defects, but
its view of group libel offers a plausible alternative interpretation of the
principle of free speech to the common view elsewhere about group libel.
American interpretive experience suggests that a sound argument of
principle not only protects such anti-constitutional speech . . . but, prop-
erly understood, renders such protection a more effective instrument of
ultimate public education in enduring constitutional values, in particular,
the place of the basic human rights of conscience and speech in a free
and democratic society of equal citizens. In American circumstances, the
principle of free speech--extended to blatantly racist and anti-Semitic
advocates like the KKK-has remarkably energized and empowered the
battle for racial justice and religious toleration under the rule of
law ....
Id. at 820-21 (citations omitted).
" See generally Anita L. Schill, Genetic Information in the Workplace: Implica-
tions for Occupational Health Surveillance, 48 AAOHN J. 80 (2000); Billings et al.,
supra note 89.
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other contexts. Social service agencies have rejected applica-
tions submitted by prospective adopting parents on the basis of
negative genetic information.9" Genetic information influences
decisions about parental rights, children's custody, criminal
sentencing, and prisoners' parole status.99 Within health care
contexts, the potential for genetic discrimination is enormous.
People may be treated as ill, for instance, and may therefore
think of themselves as ill, though they are not ill, and are
almost certain not to become ill.' ° Alternatively, care may be
withheld or not vigorously administered because of the pre-
sumption that genes determine fate.10 '
Studies confirm the existence of genetic discrimination by,
among others, employers, insurers, adoption agencies, blood
banks, and schools.0 2 Forty percent of those responding to a
9 Sheryl Stolberg, Insurance Falls Prey to Genetic Bias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27,
1994, at Al.
"' See, e.g., Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (involving
a father seeking paternity of his married lover's child on the basis of genetic test-
ing); Ilene Sherwyn Cooper, Advances in DNA Techniques Present Opportunity to
Amend EPTL to Permit Paternity Testing, 71 N.Y.S. BAR. J. 34, 34-35 (1999) (de-
scribing relevance of genetic testing to asserting right of nonmarital child to inher-
it from biological parent); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Juris-
prudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 328-29 (1992) (describing the use of
genetic tests to establish diminished responsibility and suggesting that genetic
essentialism could provide for the law's relying on "a genetic predisposition to
criminality" as a "full defense"); Deborah A. Ellingboe, Note, Sex, Lies, and Genetic
Tests, 78 MINN. L. REv. 1013, 1013-14 (1994) (describing Kelly v. Cataldo).
1" Practical consequences include the use of genetic information by health in-
surers to define preexisting conditions and thereby to deny coverage. This possibil-
ity is considered in Katskee v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Nebraska, 515 N.W.2d
645 (1994). Katskee, itself, concerned a related issue-the obligation of a health
insurer to cover prophylactic treatment for a hereditary condition from which the
insured did not (yet) suffer. See id. at 648-50; see also infra notes 112-113 and ac-
companying text (concerning case of insured who tested positive for hereditary
form of high cholesterol).
101 NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 49, at 100-01 (describing the notion of genetic
predisposition as encouraging a passive acceptance of negative facts about people
and society).
10 See generally Lisa N. Geller, Individual, Family, and Societal Dimensions of
Genetic Discrimination: A Case Study Analysis, 2 SCIENCE & ENGINEERING ETHICS
71 (1996); Billings et al., supra note 89; see also Ami S. Jaeger & William F.
Mulholland II, Impact of Genetic Privacy Legislation on Insurer Behavior, 4 GE-
NETIC TESTING 31 (2000). A 1992 survey of the U.S. Congressional Office of Tech-
nology Assessment reported that genetic information was important to insurers in
determining eligibility for insurance. Id. at 37 (citing OTA, Genetic Tests and
Health Insurance: Results of a Survey, OTA-BP-BA-98, U.S. Government Printing
Office (1992)).
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1996 survey of members of genetic support groups reported
having been asked to provide information about genetic diseas-
es on insurance application forms.0 3 Almost half of those re-
quired to provide such information were denied coverage." 4
Analysis of a questionnaire sent to thousands of people at risk
for genetic disorders indicated that about half of those respond-
ing reported having experienced genetic discrimination.0 5
Anecdotal confirmation of such discrimination is plentiful.
Members of one New Hampshire family were denied health
insurance after the family's health insurer learned, from a
doctor's notation on an insurance form, that the family's six
year-old son had Fragile X Syndrome, a genetic condition that
interferes with mental development.' The insurer denied
coverage to the boy's three sisters and parents, though none of
them had been diagnosed with the condition.0 7
Another case involved a thirty-one year old woman with a
familial history of Huntington's disease; the woman had not
been tested, and thus did not know whether she carried the
genetic alteration associated with Huntington's.0 8 She and
her husband decided to adopt rather than risk having a child
who might inherit the condition.0 9 In the middle of the adop-
tion process, the adoption agency asked the couple to withdraw
their application because of the woman's familial medical his-
tory."0 Another woman, also at risk for Huntington's disease,
103 Jaeger & Mulholland, supra note 102, at 37.
Jaeger & Mulholland, supra note 102, at 37.
1o3 Geller, supra note 102, at 75. Geller and her colleagues sent questionnaires
to 27,790 people at risk for four genetic disorders (Huntington's disease, phenylke-
tonuria, hemochromatosis, and mucopolysaccharidoses). Nine-hundred-seventeen
questionnaires were returned. Four-hundred-fifty-five respondents indicated having
experienced genetic discrimination. Geller, supra note 102, at 75.
The National Human Genome Research Institute also reports that a survey of
genetic counselors, primary care doctors, and patients, conducted in the late 1990s,
"identified 550 people who had been denied employment or insurance based on
their genetic predisposition to an illness." National Human Genome Research Insti-
tute, Genetic Information and the Workplace, at http://www.nhgri.nih.gov/HGP/-
Reports/genetics-workplace.html (last visited May 23, 2000).
Bornstein, supra note 89, at 566-67; Stolberg, supra note 98, at Al.
107 Bornstein, supra note 89, at 566-67; Stolberg, supra note 98, at Al.
103 Billings et al., supra note 89, at 480.
10 Billings et al., supra note 89, at 480.
... Billings et al., supra note 89, at 480. Billings and his colleagues solicited
information about people who had experienced genetic discrimination by advertis-
ing in newsletters and professional journals and by writing to professionals in rele-
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and also anxious to adopt a child, made public a letter she had
received from an adoption agency. The letter explained, "We
have decided, in your situation, not to proceed with your appli-
cation because there is a fifty-fifty chance of your getting
Huntington's Disease."'
In other cases, genetic discrimination has followed directly
from genetic testing, rather than from conclusions based on
familial history or ethnic membership. For example, the insur-
er of a heart attack patient in Boston refused to cover future
care for cardiovascular disease after the man tested positive
for a hereditary form of high cholesterol."2 The insurer con-
tended that the man suffered from a "pre-existing condition"
and was therefore not entitled to insurance for any symptoms
connected with high cholesterol."'
Employers and insurers anxious to obtain genetic informa-
tion have also relied on reports of family histories and on cor-
relations between various illnesses and ethnic group identities
to exclude applicants presumed to be at risk for genetic dis-
ease."4 The predictive value of such information is uncertain.
Even the results of direct genetic testing"5 cannot be relied
upon to predict health with certainty."6 Predictions based on
information about family history or ethnic identification are
even less likely to be accurate."7
vant fields. Billings et al., supra note 89, at 477; see also Geller, supra note 102,
at 77 (describing 25-year old woman precluded from adopting through agency be-
cause of family history for Huntington's Disease).
... Billings et al., supra note 89, at 480.
11 Bornstein, supra note 89, at 566 (citing Susan Ince, Predictive Testing; A
Bite of the Apple, HARV. HEALTH LETTER (Harvard Medical School Health Publica-
tions Group, Boston, MA), June, 1995, at 3, 4).
13 Bornstein, supra note 89, at 566.
11. Bornstein, supra note 89, at 568-69.
"' There are two broad categories of tests for genetic conditions. The first ana-
lyzes biochemical substances that may suggest the presence of genetic alterations.
DAVID SuzuKI & PETER KNUDTSON, GENETICS: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE NEW
GENETICS AND HUMAN VALUES 146 (1990). The second sort of test analyzes DNA
directly, either to detect chromosomal abnormalities such as that responsible for
Down's syndrome or to detect differences in allele sequences, such as that respon-
sible for sickle-cell anemia. Id.
16 See infra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
1 Insurers justify reliance on genetic information in making insurance decisions
as an extension of reliance on medical information, more generally. Bornstein,
supra note 89, at 569. Bornstein notes the difference between relying on informa-
tion showing that a person is ill and relying on information that a person is at
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Mandated genetic testing or reported cases of genetic dis-
crimination by employers, insurers, and others have not been
common, and have primarily affected people known (through
medical and family histories) to be at risk for genetic disor-
ders."' However, as genetic tests for an increasingly wide as-
sortment of diseases are developed,"9 and as the cost of such
testing decreases,' 2' employers, insurers, and others may well
require that the people they serve or employ submit to genetic
testing. Indeed, some commentators predict that genetic test-
ing will become universal. 2'
Mandated genetic testing has concrete advantages for
insurers and employers.'22 In particular, such testing promis-
es to reduce institutional costs."s Genetic testing could also
be advantageous, in certain regards, to those compelled by
insurers or employers to submit to it. For instance, genetic
tests may identify people particularly susceptible to harm in
hazardous workplace environments; presumably, many such
increased risk of becoming ill at some undetermined time in the future. Bornstein,
supra note 89, at 569.
.. See Robert H. Jerry, II, Health Insurers' Use of Genetic Information: A Mis-
souri Perspective on a Changing Regulatory Landscape, 64 Mo. L. REV. 759, 761-62
(1999) (noting that as of 1999, genetic discrimination was a "largely nonexistent
business practice" but noting as well the potential for more widespread genetic
discrimination).
Francis Collins, Director of the U.S. National Human Genome Research Insti-
tute at the National Institutes of Health, noted that genetic tests are now avail-
able "for very rare diseases in families plagued by certain illnesses" but that
"more routine testing of now-healthy people to predict their future risks of cancer
or other killers is poised to explode." Id. at 771 n.30 (citing Genetic Tests Remain
Unregulated and Inaccurate, 6 AM. POL. NETWORK-AM. HEALTH LINE 14).
In 1991, Larry Gostin predicted, "One day, employers and insurers will be
able to obtain a genetic profile from the blood drawn from a small finger prick."
Gostin, supra note 89, at 110. As the Human Genome Project nears completion, it
is possible to test directly for more and more genetic alterations.
.. See, e.g., Nesmith, supra note 52, at Al (predicting availability of genetic
tests for dozens of "major causes of illnesses and death" within ten years).
12 Genetic tests now cost between several hundred and several thousands dol-
lars. Colby, supra note 89, at 449.
.21 Colby, supra note 89, at 450.
' See, e.g., Andrew Sullivan, Counter Culture: Promotion of the Fittest, N.Y.
TIMES MAGAZINE, July 23, 2000, at 16.
1 See, e.g., The National Human Genome Research Institute, Genetic Informa-
tion and the Workplace, at http'J/www.nhgri.nih.gov/HGP/Reports/genetics work-
place.html (last visited May 23, 2000) (reporting that some employers may use
results of genetic tests to discriminate against even asymptomatic workers "be-
cause the employers fear the cost consequences").
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people could be protected by alternative assignments.124 For
the most part, however, genetic testing in employment and
insurance contexts is less likely to benefit those tested than
those requiring that such testing be conducted. 5
Thus, mandated genetic testing, and the potentially dis-
criminatory uses of genetic test results, raise broad social con-
cerns. Discriminating against people on the basis of genetic
traits over which they have no control, and which may or may
not result in illness, may be deeply unjust.126 Such discrimi-
nation may reinforce and strengthen existing social prejudice
against groups defined in genetic terms.'27 Moreover, discrim-
inatory uses of genetic information may occur even in cases in
which test results cannot be interpreted with certainty. As a
practical matter, genetic test results generally do not identify
everyone at risk for particular genetic diseases; 28 conversely,
such tests may result in false positive results. Furthermore, it
is typically difficult to make accurate predictions about health
and illness, even from accurate test results for autosomal dom-
inant genes. "For most genetic diseases," Larry Gostin ex-
plains, "the onset date, severity of symptoms, and efficacy of
treatment and management are highly variable."'29 Predic-
tions are particularly uncertain in the case of diseases associ-
ated with multiple genetic and environmental factors, among
many others, breast cancer, colon cancer, and heart dis-
ease.
30
Ironically, genetic discrimination, if widely institutional-
ized, may ultimately prove less and less useful to insurers and
124 Gostin, supra note 89, at 111.
12 In the future, genetic therapy may be widely available. At present, such
therapy is largely unavailable or, where available, ineffective. Should genetic thera-
py become a reality for people predisposed to, or suffering from, genetic diseases,
the benefits of genetic testing for those tested will increase enormously.
In April 2000, the first unequivocal success with gene therapy was reported.
All of the patients involved were infants who suffered from severe combined im-
mune deficiency, a condition viewed as "especially suited for treatment" with ge-
netic therapy. Gina Kolata, Scientists Report the First Success of Gene Therapy,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2000, at Al.
128 Gostin, supra note 89, at 112 (describing genetic discrimination as "vio-
lat[ing] basic tenets of individual justice" and as "detrimental to public health").
' See infra Part II.B.
12 Gostin, supra note 89, at 113-14.
1 Gostin, supra note 89, at 113.
120 Gostin, supra note 89, at 114.
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employers. Billings and his colleagues refer to "the myth of
genetic perfection."131 The myth assumes a " 'perfect' family
with a disease-free genome."3 2 No such family exists. 3
"Unfortunately," they explain, "all families are at risk.""4 Ge-
neticists estimate that the average person is affected by be-
tween five and fifty harmful genetic alleles.'35 As Mansoura
and Collins assert:
Genetic disease should not be thought of as the unfortunate fate of
relatively few individuals who have been affected by rare inherited
disorders. With our rapidly expanding understanding of the role of
genes in common disorders such as many forms of cancer, heart
disease, diabetes, and mental illness, it seems more likely that in
the future virtually all of our lives will be touched by the genetic
revolution.136
Perhaps, when that time arrives, genetic discrimination, even
if not broadly prohibited by law, will no longer serve institu-
tional interests.
In the meantime, however, genetic discrimination may
prove harmful to many. Among those at particular and unusu-
al risk for such discrimination are members of ethnic groups
defined long before the decoding of the human genome through
biological correlates (e.g., facial features, hair color and tex-
ture, skin color). People identified with such groups may be
excluded from financial and social opportunities because they
are assumed to be at risk for genetic conditions associated with
their ethnicity. In addition, and even more insidiously, preju-
dice against members of such groups by those with control over
insurance, employment, and other matters could be justified
through reference to genetic test results. In short, the results
of mandated genetic testing could be misused to reaffirm the
biological marginality-and thus to justify the social and eco-
131 Billings et al., supra note 89, at 480 (noting that "the chance of developing
a genetic condition is perceived differently from a similar probability of contracting
an illness not produced primarily by a gene").
13 Billings et al., supra note 89, at 480.
"' This presumes a universe in which genetic engineering is not widespread.
... Billings et al., supra note 89, at 480.
1" See Monique K. Mansoura & Francis S. Collins, Medical Implications for the
Genetic Revolution, 1 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 329, 334 (1998); see also Lisa
Seachrist, Jewish Groups Worry Genetic Studies Foster Discrimination, BIOWORLD
TODAY, Apr. 23, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library.
13' Mansoura & Collins, supra note 135, at 334.
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nomic marginality--of individuals identified with various eth-
nic groups.1
3
C. Genetic Discrimination: Limits of the Law's Response
The law's response to the dangers of genetic discrimination
has been inconsistent and inadequate. Only one federal statute
expressly regulates the use and regulation of genetic informa-
tion."8 Relevant state laws, though numerous, differ widely
from state to state and fail, as a whole, to provide comprehen-
sive protection. Moreover, constitutional law provides only a
circumscribed right to informational privacy. 1' Any such
right is limited to situations involving government action and
cannot be invoked as protection against private parties, includ-
ing researchers, insurance companies, employers, or biomedical
data banks.4
Almost four-fifths of the states have laws that limit genet-
ic discrimination in at least some regard.'' However, many
of these laws provide little practical protection.142 A few are
more comprehensive, but even these have limited applicabili-
" SUZUKI & KNUDTSON, supra note 115, at 156. Suzuki and Knudtson wrote:
Especially in societies such as ours, characterized by long histories of
prejudice against particular minorities, it is not difficult to imagine how
occupational genetic screening could lend an air of scientific legitimacy to
attempts, conscious or unconscious, to exclude certain categories of work-
ers from jobs or to restrict their access to more rewarding ones.
Despite their limited medical value, the genetic dossiers arising from
mass genetic screening of workers could, just like a factory worker's
hereditary skin color, be used to segregate genetically 'desirable' job ap-
plicants from genetically 'undesirable' ones. History demonstrates that the
most powerful groups in a society often attempt to justify their status by
proclaiming the innate superiority of their race, class or ethnic group.
Id.
130 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42, 26, and 18 U.S.C.).
... Gostin & Hodge, Jr., supra note 6, at 42 (noting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589 (1977), in which the Court noted in dicta "the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data banks
or other massive government files").
140 Id. at 22; see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
141 See Colby, supra note 89, at 464 (reporting existence of "some form of genet-
ic discrimination legislation" in thirty-nine states); see also Jerry, II, supra note
118, at 772.
142 See infra notes 143-154 and accompanying text.
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ty."4' Many state laws that regulate discriminatory uses of
genetic information cover only employers or insurers (especial-
ly health insurers).'" As a result, in such states, life insur-
ers, adoption agencies, prisons, and schools, among other
groups and institutions, are not precluded by the law from
discriminating on the basis of genetic information. Most rele-
vant state statutes have a variety of other limitations. A few,
reflecting the form of the earliest statutes aimed at regulating
genetic information, 45 prohibit genetic discrimination with
regard only to specific diseases.146 Other state statutes pro-
vide broader protection, but permit various forms of genetic
discrimination or allow invasions of genetic privacy. In New
York, for instance, employers may require genetic testing for
conditions indicating "increased risk of disease as a result of
working in [the employment] environment."47 Employers are
not permitted to deny employment on the basis of genetic test
results, but the employee's genetic privacy is unprotected.
Moreover, New York allows insurers to rely on the results of
genetic testing in underwriting. 48 A number of states, includ-
ing Illinois and Indiana, permit consumers to provide genetic
information to insurers.49 In those states, insurers are able
to offer premium reductions to those submitting test results
indicating the absence of various genetic conditions.'50 In con-
sequence, insurance will be increasingly costly for those who
refrain from being tested or from submitting test results, or
who test positive for genetic alterations associated with ill-
1 See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying text.
,14 See COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-
54-1, -8 (1996); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 27-909 (Supp. 1999); see also Natalie Anne
Stepanuk, Comment, Genetic Information and Third Party Access to Information:
New Jersey's Pioneering Legislation as a Model for Federal Privacy Protection of
Genetic Information, 47 CATH. U.L. REV. 1105, 1123-24 (1998).
" The first statute dealing with genetic discrimination was passed in North
Carolina in 1975. The law prohibited employment discrimination against people
exhibiting traits for sickle cell or hemoglobin C. Rothenberg et al., supra note 53,
at 1755.
.. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:652.1 (West 1995); TENN CODE ANN.
§ 56-7-207 (Supp. 1997).
147 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(19)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
1'4 N.Y. INS. LAW § 2612 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
" 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/20 (West 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-8-26-9
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 1999).
15 Id.
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ness.15' In still other states, laws regulating the use of genet-
ic information do not include information from medical histo-
ries within the scope of "genetic information" and thus fail to
protect against discrimination based on family histories.152
A few states have relatively inclusive statutes that limit
genetic discrimination and protect genetic privacy. For in-
stance, the New Jersey Genetic Privacy Act 5 widely protects
privacy with regard to genetic information. The Act was in-
tended to protect those with genetic diseases or predisposed to
such diseases from societal discrimination generally, not only
in insurance and employment contexts."
However, even broad statutes, such as New Jersey's, pro-
vide only limited protection because their reach is significantly
limited by the terms of the Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act of 1974 ("ERISA7).'55 Under ERISA, federal law pre-
empts state law with regard to employers' self-funded health
insurance plans.156 Most people not receiving health care
through the government are covered by such self-funded
plans. 5 7 Therefore, even in states with apparently compre-
hensive statutes, many people are not protected from genetic
discrimination by health insurers.
At present, only one federal statute, the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA'),"5' pro-
vides an express federal statutory response to genetic discrimi-
nation and the invasion of genetic privacy.5 9 HIPAA prohib-
... See Jerry, II, supra note 118, at 770 (noting that if insured are able to
volunteer results of genetic testing and insurers are able to rely on those results,
higher premiums will be paid by people with "no tests or poor results").
15 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4301 (West Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN.,
INS. § 27-909 (Supp. 1999).
13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12 (West Supp. 2000).
... Stepanuk, supra note 144, at 1124 n.88, 1127 n.108 (citing Senate Health
Committee Statement to Senate Committee Substitute for Senate, Nos. 695 and
854, 207th Legis. Reg. Sess. 1 (N.J. 1996)).
... Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (1974).
156 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
"" Kourtney L. Pickens, Comment, Don't Judge Me By My Genes: A Survey of
Federal Genetic Discrimination Legislation, 34 TULSA L.J. 161, 172 (1998).
... Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 29, 42, 26, and 18
U.S.C.).
159 In addition to this congressional response, an Executive Order, issued by
President Clinton in early 2000, prohibits federal agencies from discriminating
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its insurance companies (including self-funded employer plans)
from relying on genetic information to establish eligibility for
health insurance coverage... and thus from classifying genet-
ic predispositions as pre-existing conditions.16' However, the
statute provides no definition of the term "genetic informa-
tion," and thus it fails clearly to prohibit discriminatory reli-
ance on information obtained from medical histories.6 2 More-
over, the statute does not prevent plans from raising rates or
excluding coverage altogether for particular medical condi-
tions."
Other federal laws,"M including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1963165 and Title I of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 166  provide protection
against genetic discrimination in certain contexts. But both
statutes were promulgated before genetic testing was a serious
practical concern; thus, neither was intended specifically to
address the dangers of genetic discrimination.'67
against employees and applicants for employment on the basis of "genetic informa-
tion." Executive Order 13145, 65 Fed. Reg. 6877 (Feb. 10, 2000). The Order de-
fines genetic information to include information obtained from genetic testing of an
individual or of an individual's family member or from family histories indicating
the presence of a genetic disease or disorder within the family. The Executive
Order provides exceptions. An employer may ask someone who has been given a
conditional offer of employment about the occurrence of a disease or a medical
condition or disorder in family members "if the request or requirement is consis-
tent with the Rehabilitation Act and other applicable law." Id.
16 29 U.S.C. § 1182(9)(1) (2000).
..1 Health Insurance and Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 104 P.L.
No. 104-191, § 701(b)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 1936, 1940 (1996).
1.2 Jerry II, supra note 118, at 775-76 (noting that the structure of HIPAA
suggests that the term "genetic information" "should be given a reading that does
not include medical history").
13 26 U.S.C. § 9802(a)(2)(B) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B) (Supp. III 1997);
see also Pickens, supra note 157, at 173-74; Rothenberg et al., supra note 53, at
1756; Stepanuk, supra note 144, at 1110, n.14.
1' In addition to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1990 and Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, both of which are considered at infra text accom-
panying notes 165-172, the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), requires
federal agencies to abide by fair information practices with regard to the collection
and use of records. See Gostin & Hodge, Jr., supra note 6, at 4344; see also id.
at 54-56 (delineating fair information practices).
16 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 2000a-2000h-6 (2000).
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
167 In 1995, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (the "EEOC"), the
agency responsible for enforcing the ADA, issued guidelines that asserted that an
employer who discriminates against an individual on the basis of "genetic informa-
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More specifically, Title VII prohibits employers from dis-
criminating on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or nation-
al origin. 16' Thus, the requirement that members of a pro-
tected group submit to genetic testing in an employment con-
text,169 as well as genetic discrimination by an employer or
prospective employer against members of a protected group,
might be illegal under Title VII. 70 Although Title VII would
seem to be relevant to cases involving genetic conditions that
disproportionately affect a relevant class under the Act, almost
no case law exists that involves the use of genetic information
in the workplace. One Ninth Circuit decision allowed a Title
VII claim involving genetic discrimination to go forward.'
But even if other courts follow the Ninth Circuit model, Title
VII is clearly limited in preventing discrimination in employ-
ment contexts because it only prohibits genetic discrimination
linked with a group protected under the Act. In addition, an
employer may respond to a showing that reliance on genetic
information had a "disparate impact" on a protected group by
demonstrating that the treatment alleged to violate the statute
was justified because it was "job related" or a "business neces-
sity."17
2
tion relating to illness, disease, or other disorders" would be viewed as having
violated the ADA. 1 EEOC COMPL. MAN. (BNA) 902-45 (1995). The practical
effect of the EEOC guidance remains unclear. National Human Genome Research
Institute, Genetic Information and the Workplace, Jan. 20, 1998, at http/-
www.nhgri.nih.gov/HGP/Reports/genetics.-workplace.html (last visited May 23, 2000).
'" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
... The Act applies to private employers with at least fifteen employees, govern-
mental employers, laboratory organizations, and employment agencies. See id.
§ 2000(e).
170 See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1272
(9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that employer's singling out female and black employ-
ees for "non-consensual testing" falls "neatly into a Title VII framework").
1,1 Id. at 1264. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the U.S. Constitution
protects the right to genetic privacy. This claim was relevant in that the defen-
dant, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, was a government employer. The claims
against Lawrence-Berkeley Laboratory centered around its having tested African-
American employees for the sickle-cell trait and female employees for pregnancy.
172 Plaintiffs alleging genetic discrimination under Title VII would have to show
that genetic information was used disproportionately to effect groups protected
under the statute. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (delin-
eating requirements for "disparate impact" claim). If plaintiffs succeed in this task,
the burden shifts to the employer who can justify the treatment in question by
showing that it is 'job-related" or a "business necessity." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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The ADA may be more generally applicable to genetic
discrimination in the workplace than Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, but potential reliance on the ADA to pro-
tect against genetic discrimination is limited in other ways.
The statute, which applies only to employers with fifteen or
more employees,173 expressly prohibits discrimination against
employees or potential employees because of a disability, and
has been interpreted by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (the "EEOC") to protect people against employers
who "discriminate. . . on the basis of ... genetic informa-
tion."'74 Moreover, some (though not all)7 5 have interpreted
the decision of the Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott 76 to
define disability broadly under the ADA.
177
However, even if the ADA does apply to genetic discrimi-
nation, it does not prevent employers from requiring
preplacement medical examinations that include genetic test-
ing. Furthermore, the EEOC has concluded that employers
may exclude people who pose a risk to the health or safety of
others or of self'7 This standard may be especially hard to
No Title VII plaintiff alleging that an employer's use of genetic information
had a "disparate impact" on a covered group has ever been successful. See Eliza-
beth Reiter, Comment, The Department of Defense DNA Repository: Practical Anal-
ysis of the Government's Interest and the Potential for Genetic Discrimination, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 975, 1010 (1999).
173 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2000).
174 1 EEOC COAL. MAN. (BNA) 902, at 902-45 (1995). EEOC rules are not
binding on courts. See Laura F. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination: Why Bragdon
Does Not Ensure Protection, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLy 330, 335 (2000) (citing
Mark S. Dichter & Sarah E. Sutor, The New Genetic Age: Do Our Genes Make Us
Disabled Individuals Under the Americans With Disabilities Act?, 42 VILL. L. REV.
613, 620 n.23 (1997)).
171 Rothstein, supra note 174, at 335.
178 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
177 George J. Annas, Protecting Patients from Discrimination-The Americans
with Disabilities Act and HIV Infection, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1255, 1257 (1998).
178 The ADA provides that an employer may exclude an individual who poses "a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace," 42
U.S.C. § 12113(b), and defines "direct threat" as a "significant risk to the health
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation," 42
U.S.C. § 12111(3). The EEOC interpreted the statute to allow exclusions in cases
involving "a significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the
individual or others." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(r) (2001) (emphasis added). See Amanda J.
Wong, Comment, Distinguishing Speculative and Substantial Risk in the
Presymptomatic Job Applicant: Interpreting the Interpretation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Direct Threat Defense, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1135, 1139 (2000) (argu-
ing that EEOC interpretation was not justified by ADA and allows for discrimina-
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apply fairly in the context of presymptomatic genetic condi-
tions.'79 In addition, although the statute prohibits genetic
discrimination, it may be difficult for an individual to prove
that failure to obtain employment or a promotion resulted from
genetic discrimination.' Finally, the virtual absence of rele-
vant case law makes it difficult to assess the extent to which
the ADA may be useful in protecting against genetic discrimi-
nation in the workplace.
Thus, to date, neither state nor federal law has responded
effectively to the risks of genetic discrimination and of inva-
sions of genetic privacy by employers, insurers, health care
workers, and others. In consequence, as the human genome is
mapped and interpreted, genetic privacy is inadequately pro-
tected, and no uniform defense exists against genetic discrimi-
nation. These threats are especially ominous for groups histor-
ically defined through metaphors of "blood," since genetic infor-
mation can be interpreted to reaffirm the social marginality of
such groups and to justify prejudice against them. To such
groups we now turn.
III. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND STIGMATIZATION: AN ETHNIC
EXAMPLE
Virtually no one is immune from genetic discrimination.
But people identified with ethnic groups may be particularly
vulnerable to genetic discrimination within institutional con-
texts and to genetic stigmatization"'1 within the society
broadly.182 Employers, insurers, and others may arrive at as-
tion the ADA was intended to prevent).
179 See Wong, supra note 178, at 1160-65 (arguing that predispositions are diffi-
cult to analyze fairly under the individualized analysis demanded by the ADA).
" Rothenberg et al., supra note 53, at 1756.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 90-95 (considering distinction between
discrimination and stigmatization).
" This Article focuses on a Jewish example. Other groups are also vulnerable
to genetic discrimination. Within the American context, African-Americans are
especially likely to suffer from discriminatory uses of genetic testing and research.
For centuries, science, reflecting society, has described African-Americans derogato-
rily in terms of heredity. Anita Allen quotes an illustrative 1926 article on the
"Negro," published in the ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA. Anita LaFrance Allen, Ge-
netic Testing, Nature, and Trust, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 887, 890 (1997) (quoting
and citing 19 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 344 (13th ed. 1926). Allen quotes and
describes that article:
[Vol. 66: 3
2000] PERSONHOOD, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE NEW GENETICS 787
sumptions about an individual's genome from information
regarding the genome of the individual's ethnic group."s
Such discrimination may be especially harmful when aimed at
individuals belonging to groups that have historically been
singled out for racist treatment on the basis of somatic charac-
teristics."'
Moreover, information about genetic alterations regarding
members of groups historically subject to racism can provide a
pretext for further discrimination, both within and beyond
institutional settings. Even more, within society, generally
racist assumptions may direct social interpretations of genetic
Citing learned authorities the article asserted that: "Mentally the Negro
is inferior to the white." The Negro is subject to "indolence" and "lethar-
gy" perhaps due to "premature closing of the cranial sutures and lateral
pressure of the frontal bone" or because, "after puberty sexual matters
take the first place in the Negro's life." Negroes "far surpass white men
in acuteness of vision, hearing, direction and topography." But the Negro
is like "a child, normally good-natured and cheerful, but subject to sud-
den fits of emotion and passion during which he is capable of performing
acts of singular atrocity . . . ." When it comes to hair, the Negro is like
neither the white man nor the higher ape; for those two have true hair,
whereas the Negro head is capped by a kind of wool, a "woolly" or "friz-
zly" pile capable of being felted. Finally, "the recognized leaders of the
[Negro] race are almost invariably persons of mixed blood, and the quali-
ties which have made them leaders are derived certainly in part and
perhaps mainly from their white ancestry."
Id. (citations omitted; all citations are from pp. 344-46 of the ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA article). More recently, a study in the journal Pediatrics reported on
the relationship between sickle-cell anemia and intelligence. M. McCormack et al.,
A Comparison of the Physical and Intellectual Development of Black Children With
and Without Sickle-Cell Trait, 56 PEDIATRICS 1021 (1975). Anita Allen comments
that still "there are people on the lookout for evidence that Blacks are genetically
inferior to whites in intellect and that Blacks have criminal proclivities fixed in
their genetic make-ups." Allen, supra, at 890 (citation omitted). The history of the
treatment African-Americans have received in research and medical contexts in the
United States is not comforting to those concerned about potential discriainatory
uses of genetic information. The most well-known, and perhaps most startling
(though hardly the only), example is that of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, conduct-
ed during a period of forty years by the United States Public Health Service. The
subjects, poor African-American men, were not offered, and were discouraged from
seeking, treatment for the condition so that the government could study the "natu-
ral history" of the disease. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHIcS: HEALTH CARE
LAW AND ETHICS 381 (3d ed. 1997).
183 Similarly, genetic discrimination can result from assumptions about an
individual's predisposition to disease because the individual is kin to others who
suffer from, or who are known to be at risk for, a genetic illness.
1' See supra notes 168-172 and accompanying text (delineating limitations of
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 in responding to such cases).
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information about such groups and about individuals associat-
ed with them. In short, discriminatory use of genetic informa-
tion by employers, insurers, and others can debar members of
ethnic groups from social benefits, including employment op-
portunities and insurance coverage. Moreover, genetic informa-
tion can be used within institutional settings and more gener-
ally to spread unappealing images of particular groups. These
images can then motivate further discrimination, which can be
"justified" on "rational," genetic grounds.
The discourse that surrounds the new genetics can accom-
modate prejudicial impulses that have encouraged society to
define certain groups of people as physically marginal or inferi-
or. Professors Nelkin and Lindee locate racist images in the
language of the new genetics during the early 1990s:
[A] physical anthropologist.., at the University of California at
Berkeley lectured to hundreds of undergraduates on the genetic
basis of racial differences. [A professor at] City College in New
York... has asserted that differences in average test scores (which
unquestionably exist) are self-evident proof of genetic differenc-
es-as though the SAT provided direct access to DNA- 1
Apparently neutral genetic screening programs can threat-
en similar results. Several decades ago, African-Americans
expressed serious concern about the danger to their community
created by widescale screening for sickle-cell anemia. In the
early 1970s, Congress passed a law that financed and encour-
aged voluntary screening of African-Americans for the sickle-
cell trait.'86 Before passage of that law, over a dozen states,
mostly in the South, made marriage licenses and admission to
primary school for African-Americans dependent on sickle-cell
screening.8 7 Such screening was eventually abandoned, but
18 NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 49, at 116-17.
18 National Sickle Cell Anemia Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-294, 86 Stat. 136
(1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(b)(1) et seq.). The Sickle Cell Act
was passed in 1972, as an amendment to the Public Health Service Act, ch. 373,
tit. I, § 2, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.);
see also Tom Dworetzky, No Deltas Need Apply; Genetic Screening, 15 OMNI 5, 16
(1993), available at LEXIS, News Group File, All. In 1981, the Act was amended
in part and repealed in part, Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 95 Stat. 827
(1981).
' Mark A. Erhart, Science Seeks Advances, Not Racism, CHICAGO TRIB., Feb.
16, 1998, available at LEXIS News Library, CHTRIB File; Tony Pugh,
KnightRidder News Service, Blacks Remain Uneasy About Health Care System, FT.
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members of the targeted community were left feeling that they
had been betrayed. 8 ' Some concluded that the screening pro-
grams constituted an attempt at racial genocide.'89 African-
Americans have since hesitated to submit voluntarily to genet-
ic screening projects.'"
In contrast, Jews have participated enthusiastically in a
wide variety of genetic screening and research programs. 9'
They were encouraged to do so by researchers seeking subjects
from communities presumed to be more homogenous genetical-
ly than the population as a whole,'92 and perhaps also-as
several commentators have suggested-by their own tradition-
al interest in science and research.9 3 More recently, however,
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Aug. 10, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library,
FWSTEL File.
1" Black organizations lobbied Congress to pass the National Sickle-Cell Anemia
Control Act of 1972. Pugh, supra note 187.
Pugh, supra note 187; Rosamond Rhodes, Autonomy, Respect, and Genetic
Information Policy: A Reply to Tuija Takala and Matti Hayry, 25 J. MED. &
PHILO. 114, 117 (2000).
Hannah Bradby described the screening programs for the sickle-cell trait as a
"benchmark for failure." Genetics and Racism, in THE TROUBLED HELIM SOCIAL
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW HUMAN GENETICS 295, 303
(Theresa Marteau & Martin Richards eds., 1996). Bradby explained:
Although initially welcomed as an initiative to meet the long-neglected
health needs of African Americans, and a means by which they could
take control of their own lives, the U.S. sickle cell disease programme
was subsequently described as racist, as a form of anti-black eugenics
and even a step towards genocide.
Id. at 304 (citations omitted).
" Madeleine J. Goodman & Lenn E. Goodman, Overselling of Genetic Anxiety,
12 HAST. CENT. RPT. 20, 20 (1982) (noting criticism of mass screening for sickle-
cell trait and discontinuance of programs "on grounds that it stigmatized the black
population"); see also Mark Levin, Screening Jews and Gentiles: A Consideration of
the Ethics of Genetic Screening Within the Jewish Community: Challenges and
Responses, 3 GENETIC TESTING 207, 207 (1999).
191 See generally Nancy J. Nelson, Ashkenazi Community is Not Unwilling to
Participate in Genetic Research, 90 J. NATL CANCER INST. 884 (1998).
1 Genetics: U.S. Jews Urged to Help Testing, GENE THERAPY WEEKLY, May 4,
1998, available at LEXIS, News Group File, All (citing Francis Collins, Director of
the National Human Gonome Research Institute, urging Jews, and others, to par-
ticipate in genetic trials).
1" Seachrist, supra note 135; Sally Lehrman, Jewish Leaders Seek Genetic
Guidelines, 389 NATURE 322, 322 (Sept. 25, 1997); Genetics: U.S. Jews Urged to
Help Testing, supra note 192. But see Nancy Press et al., How are Jewish Women
Different From All Other Women?: Anthropological Perspectives on Genetic Suscepti-
bility Testing for Breast Cancer, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 135, 138-39 (1997) (asserting
that although "Jewish culture places particular value on science and medicine" and
although "in Jewish culture scientific knowledge is always thought to be useful,"
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leaders of Jewish organizations, as well as Jewish scientists
and researchers," have begun to question whether the dis-
advantages of communal participation in such research and
screening projects may be greater than the advantages.'
Jewish participation in genetic screening and research efforts
has resulted in more genetic information about Jews than
about other groups. And that information may entail a series
of interconnected dangers for Jewish communities.
Examination of the present and potential dangers that
genetic information poses for Jews reveals some of the broader
dangers inherent in a social ideology that seems increasingly
to view people's thoughts and actions as the inevitable conse-
quence of natural ("genetic") facts. Thus, such dangers illus-
trate concretely the implications for American culture of shift-
ing understandings of individuals and of groups that develop
from an ideology of genetic inheritance.
A. Genetic Alterations Associated with Ashkenazi Jews
A disproportionate number of harmful genetic alterations
have been identified with Ashkenazi Jews. Among them are
alterations that predispose people to Tay-Sachs disease,'
breast cancer,'97  ovarian cancer,' Bloom Syndrome,'99
and colon cancer."0 Publicity attending these findings has
resulted in the widespread, though erroneous, belief that Jews
are more prone to genetic disorders than other people.20'
Jewish women may not "react differently from other women with regard to inter-
est in genetic testing for breast cancer").
194 Lehrman, supra note 193, at 322.
19 Lehrman, supra note 193, at 322.
" Levin, supra note 190, at 208.
19 Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer, The Genetic 'Quick Fix,' and the Jewish
Community, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 98 (1997).
Id.
1 Benjamin B. Roa et al., Ashkenazi Jewish Population Frequency of the Bloom
Syndrome Gene 2281A6ins7 Mutation, 3 GENETIC TESTING 219 (1999).
2" Nelson, supra note 191, at 884.
201 Marlene E. Post, Curb Bias Against Mutant-Gene Carriers, NEWSDAY, Aug.
27, 1997, available at LEXIS, Current File (referring in headline to Jews as "mu-
tant gene-carriers").
Even doctors and scientists believe that Jews are more likely to suffer from
genetic diseases than others. One sperm bank in Boston advises patients not to
use "Jewish sperm," explaining that Jewish donors are particularly likely to trans-
mit genetic diseases to their offspring. Interview with Anonymous (a sperm bank
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There is no evidence that Jews are more likely than anyone
else to carry genetic alterations predisposing them to dis-
ease.0 2 A disproportionate number of genetic alterations
have been identified with Ashkenazi Jews because the popula-
tion has submitted willingly to genetic testing and has been
more systematically studied than most other groups.0 3 In
fact, all people appear to have a significant number of genetic
alterations that predispose them to serious diseases. Francis
Collins, director of the National Human Genome Research
Institute, estimates the number, on average, to be somewhere
between five and fifty.0 4 "There is no evidence," asserts Col-
lins, "that the burden of genetic flaws is greater for one popu-
lation than another."2 5
In addition, it is comparatively easy to identify genetic
alterations associated with groups, such as Ashkenazi Jews,
that have interbred for significant periods of time.0 ' Particu-
lar genetic alterations are likely to appear with greater fre-
quency among comparatively isolated populations.0 7 Indeed,
genetic alterations have been identified with several groups
that have been relatively isolated from other populations or
that have tended not to intermarry with surrounding popula-
tions.0 ' Among such groups are Finns, Norwegians, Amish,
and Icelanders." 9 As a sociological matter, however, Jews dif-
fer from these groups in having been subject to discrimination
for centuries, often justified through reference to prejudicial
images of Jews' deformed, marginal physicality. -10
patient/donee), May 2000 (on file with author).
202 Eeta Prince-Gibson, Put to the Test, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 4, 1998, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library (notifig absence of evidence that any population
carries more "genetic flaws" than any other).
2" Id. (noting commercial companies' interest in promoting genetic testing and
referring to representatives of one such company, Myriad Genetics, whose repre-
sentatives advised doctors that Jewishness was one among a set of criteria that
indicated a need for genetic testing).
2' Nelson, supra note 191, at 885.
205 Id.
2" Seachrist, supra note 135 (referring to so-called "founder effect" as one of the
causes of correlation between genetic alterations and comparatively isolated popula-
tions).
20 See supra note 206 (referring to "founder effect").
208 The Jews of Eastern Europe and Russia tended to live in isolation from
surrounding populations. They spoke their own language (Yiddish) and lived in
their own villages (shtetls). See Markel, supra note 11, at 52-53.
20 Nelson, supra note 191, at 884.
210 Genetics: U.S. Jews Urged to Help Testing, GENE THERAPY WEEKLY, May 4,
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In fact, so-called "genetic markers," associated with com-
paratively isolated groups of people, do not indicate "real"
racial differences:
Despite the existence of such genetic markers for particular groups,
though, the genes carry a wider, paradoxical lesson about "racial"
differences-which is that, in the main, there aren't any .... Over
the years [Dr. Cavalli-Sforzal has examined a wide range of genes in
a wide range of populations. These populations do differ genetically,
but the pattern of differences in well-known genes such as those for
blood groups and the HLA proteins of the immune system rarely
conform to the conventional racial picture.
In fact, it is remarkable how homogenous humanity is. Around
85% of the genetic variability measured by Dr. Cavalli-Sforza is
variation between individuals within a given group. Another 6% is
variation between groups within a single continent, and 9% is varia-
tion between continents .... 211
Unfortunately, such information will not necessarily obliterate
the use of genetic information, including reliance on genetic
markers, to validate racist images. Thus, the identification of
genetic alterations with Jews (and other groups whose social
marginality has been justified and reinforced through reference
to somatic characteristics) may have social implications not
relevant to the decoding of genetic alterations within the popu-
lation as a whole.
1998, available at LEXIS, Current File (quoting Karen Rothenberg of the Univer-
sity of Maryland as having said, "Those other groups [i.e., the Amish, Mormons,
Finns, Icelanders], none of them are stigmatized .... The one thing that every-
one Jewish shares is a concern for anti-Semitism").
211 Survey of the Human Genome, supra note 2, at 12.
[Vol. 66:3
20001 PERSONHOOD, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE NEW GENETICS 793
Jews first volunteered for mass genetic screening pro-
grams in the 1970s as part of an effort to identify carriers of
Tay-Sachs disease, a neurological condition that occurs primar-
ily in descendants of Jews from Eastern Europe.212 The dis-
ease is inherited recessively, and thus occurs only when both
parents are carriers; carriers themselves are unaffected by the
disorder.213 During the first decade of Tay-Sachs screening,
over 100,000 people were screened in the United States.214
About four percent were identified as Tay-Sachs carriers.215
Internationally, over one million adults were tested by 1992,
and over 1,000 couples were identified as at risk for having
children who would suffer from the disease. 6
The apparent success of Tay-Sachs screening programs at
identifying carriers and affected fetuses27 was compromised
by a number of unsettling consequences. Some of those identi-
21 Paul J. Edelson, The Tay-Sachs Disease Screening Program in the U. S. as a
Model for the Control of Genetic Disease: An Historical View, 7 HEALTH MATRIX
125, 126 (1997); Levin, supra note 190, at 207.
Tay-Sachs is a central nervous system disorder. It affects children in the first
year of life, leading to blindness, seizures, and retardation. The condition is inevi-
tably fatal, generally in early childhood. Edelson, supra, at 125. An assay for dis-
ease-in particular, for the Tay-Sachs enzyme (Hexosaminidase A)-was developed
in 1971. Id. at 127.
The condition occurs only in those homozygous for the gene. Carrier parents
are unaffected and their children are unaffected if the other parent is not also a
carrier. Id. Two carrier parents have a twenty-five percent chance of having an
affected child.
213 Goodman & Goodman, supra note 191, at 21; Regina Kennen & Robert M.
Schmidt, Stigmatization of Carrier Status: Social Implications of Heterozygote Ge-
netic Screening Programs, 68 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1116, 1118 (1978).
214 Edelson, supra note 212, at 129.
215 Edelson, supra note 212, at 129. Some have concluded that the screening
was more successful among Orthodox Jews than among other groups. Hannah
Bradby, Genetics and Racism, in THE TROUBLED HELIX: SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW HUMAN GENETICS 307 (Theresa Marteau & Martin
Richards eds., 1996) (noting testing of only fifteen percent of "at-risk persons per
community").
216 Levin, supra note 190, at 208. Through amniocentesis or chorionic villae
sampling, 469 fetuses affected with Tay-Sachs were identified. The vast majority of
these were aborted. Abortions were performed on 451 of the 469 affected fetuses.
Levin, supra note 190, at 208.
217 Screening programs were less successful outside the U.S. In Britain, for in-
stance, only 400 of the 400,000 members of the British Jewish community were
tested. Edelson, supra note 212, at 130 (citing Charles R. Scriver & Reynold J. M.
Gold, Tay-Sachs Heterozygote Screening: Specificity and Sensitivity, in TAY-SACHS
DISEASE: SCREENING AND PREVENTION 139-43 (Michael M. Kaback et al. eds.,
1977).
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fled as Tay-Sachs carriers suffered serious psychological harm,
perhaps because they did not adequately understand the impli-
cations of "carrier status"21 ' or perhaps, more generally, be-
cause the notion of genetic alterations suggests physical, and
thus social, deformity or, at least, marginality. In any event, a
few couples, learning that one was a carrier for Tay-Sachs,
canceled their plans to marry, even though neither the "carri-
er" nor any child produced through the union would ever have
suffered from the disease.219 More broadly, those identified as
carriers of the Tay-Sachs gene experienced significant anxiety
and depression.22
In recent years, members of the American Jewish commu-
nity have become concerned about genetic screening and re-
search programs that threaten to mark Jews as more likely
than non-Jews to be genetically flawed. At least one journalist
has asserted that blood samples from Jews tested in Tay-Sachs
screening programs have remained on file at various medical
facilities and have been used in research projects, though the
subjects never consented to such use.' These projects are
further reported to have resulted in some of the early findings
about additional genetic alterations associated with Ashkenazi
Jews. 
222
B. Reviving Anti-Semitic Images
Such findings can resuscitate a disconcerting canard that
Jews are diseased and physically marginal. Some public re-
sponses to the results of genetic screening programs and re-
search projects among Jews reflect such canards. For instance,
several journalists have described the identification of genetic
alterations associated with Ashkenazi Jews in terms that re-
flect historic images of the Jew as physically deformed and
dangerous. Eeta Prince-Gibson explains:
218 Levin, supra note 190, at 208.
219 See supra note 212 (noting that only the homozygous condition results in the
disease).
2" See Levin, supra note 190, at 208 (describing results of psychological studies
of those identified as Tay-Sachs carriers).
221 Prince-Gibson, supra note 202.
222 Id.
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Ashkenazi Jews are a relatively homogeneous group... who volun-
teer for testing and who tend to live in the large urban centers with
medical research institutions... [and] are among the first groups in
which ethnic-specific cancer-causing alterations have been found.
But these facts were not reflected in the newspaper headlines.
Newsday ran a series on "Mutant-Gene Carriers." A midwest region-
al paper proclaimed: "Ashkenazi Jewish women stalked by second
mutant breast-cancer gene." And a Jewish newspaper in the New
York region published a series of articles on "tainted Jewish
genes."'
Such responses recall images that punctuate Western history,
portraits of Jews as marked in their bodies-as flawed, de-
formed, and diseased. "The marked body of the Jew," explains
Laurie Zoloth-Dorfinan, "has long been a source of reference
against which to measure the normal human body, read gener-
ally as the body of the Christian male."2"
In the thirteenth century, a version of the myth of the
blood libel proclaimed that Jews needed Christian blood in
order to disguise their demonic bodies." That myth was
grounded in theological conjecture and devotional piety. By the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when science replaced
religion as society's central ideological anchor, images of Jew-
ish deformity were preserved in the language of science and
objective truth.226 The ideology that defined the Jew as differ-
ent shifted, but the Jew continued to represent spiritual and
physical difference in the West. Sandor Gilman suggests a
"generalized vocabulary of difference which seems to be part of
Western (Christian or secularized) means of representing the
Jew."227 Gilman continues:
This model of representing the Jew is present in the earliest Chris-
tian texts, including.., the Gospels. The power of these images
enables them to exist, with only shifts in their rhetorical form,
through the ages. This sense of difference impacts on the Jew who is
22 Id.
Laurie Zoloth-Dorfman, Mapping the Normal Human Self- The Jew and the
Mark of Otherness, in GENETICS: ISSUES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 180, 181-82 (Ted Pe-
ters ed., 1998).
2" Levin, supra note 190, at 211.
2 Zoloth-Dorfman, supra note 224, at 180, 182.
SANDER GIimAN, THE JEW'S BODY 235 (1991). I am grateful to Laurie
Zoloth-Dorfman's Article, Mapping the Normal Human Self, supra note 224, at
182, for the reference to Gilman's book.
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caught in the web of power which controls and shapes his or her
psyche and body. 8
This view was reflected in the American eugenics move-
ment, which flourished during the first several decades of the
twentieth century229  and which dedicated itself to
"upgrad[ing] the hereditary quality of the American peo-
ple."23" Several leading eugenicists,"' committed to the no-
tion of Nordic superiority, justified dislike for non-Nordic peo-
ple as a "matter of science, not of prejudice or ill-will," 2 and
thus attempted to legitimate hostility toward (among others)
Jews, African-Americans, Hindus, Catholics, and Indians."3
An American eugenicist named Madison Grant described Jews
as people of" 'dwarf stature, peculiar mentality, and ruthless
concentration on self-interests' " who were " 'being engrafted
upon the stock of the nation.' ""
Similarly, in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany,
Jews were identified and documented (and thus distinguished
from Germans) through the languages of science and medicine.
Medieval religious images of the Jew as Other were recast by
scientific discourse that depended upon measurement and
observation.235  They remained, however, essentially un-
changed. The tenacity of these images is evident from Gilman's
study of the shifting image of the "Jewish foot.""5 Gilman ex-
plores -the treatment of the Jewish foot by nineteenth- and
twentieth-century German doctors and scientists as an illustra-
tion of the broader social effort of contemporary German cul-
ture to prove that "some 'races' are inherently weaker, 'degen-
erate,' more at risk for certain types of disease than oth-
'" GILMAN, supra note 227, at 235.
2" LUDMERER, supra note 51, at 7.
230 Id.
2 Among this group were Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Ellsworth
Huntington, Harry H. Laughlin, Henry F. Osborn, Prescott Hall, and Robert deC.
Ward. Id. at 25-26.
232 Id. at 26.
2 Id. at 28.
' LUDMERER, supra note 51, at 28 (quoting MADISON GRANT, PASSING OF THE
GREAT RACE 218 (1933)).
2 See generally GILMAN, supra note 227 (describing "scientific" descriptions and
analyses of the Jewish foot in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Germany).
2.6 GILMAN, supra note 227, at 38-59. Only one essay in Gilman's book is con-
cerned with the Jewish foot. Others consider various anatomical, emotional, and
behavioral dimensions that were taken to define the Jew as marginal.
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ers." 7 "In the world of nineteenth century medicine," Gilman
notes, "this difference becomes labeled as the 'pathological' or
'pathogenic' qualities of the Jewish body." 2"
The particular claim Gilman considers was that the feet of
the Jews'9 were weak, as evidenced in the flatness of Jews'
feet or in the Jews' peculiar gait.2' German scientists drew
charts detailing the deviance of the Jewish foot. Jewish scien-
tists accepted the evidence and agreed that the Jewish foot
was abnormal. Jewish feet were observed, measured, and com-
pared with Christian feet. A 1936 German textbook reported:
"Flat feet are especially frequent among the Jews. Salaman
reports during the World War that about a sixth of the 5,000
Jewish soldiers examined had flat feet while in a similar sam-
ple of other English soldiers it occurred in about a forti-
eth."24' Almost always, reports Gilman, anatomical discus-
sions of the abnormalities of the Jewish foot were related to
the consequent inability of the Jew to serve adequately as a
foot soldier.24 2 Thus, the Jewish foot symbolized and ex-
plained the inability of the Jew to participate adequately in
national life. Gilman connects the nineteenth-century German
vision of the Jewish foot with earlier images of deformed Jew-
ish feet as symbolic of Jewish spiritual deformity (an inevitable
product of the Jew's standing outside Christendom):
The idea that the Jew's foot is unique has analogies with the hidden
sign of difference attributed to the cloven-footed devil of the middle
ages .... By the nineteenth century the relationship between the
image of the Jew and that of the hidden devil is to be found not in a
religious but in a secularized scientific context. It still revolves in
part around the particular nature of the Jews foot-no longer the
foot of the devil but now the pathognomonic foot of the "bad" citizen
of the new national state. The political significance of the Jew's foot
within the world of nineteenth century medicine is thus closely
related to the idea of the "foot-soldier, of the popular militia, which
7 GILMAN, supra note 227, at 39.
GILMAN, supra note 227, at 39.
The "Jew" at issue in Gilman's analysis of nineteenth century studies of
Jewish bodies was the male Jew ("the Jew with the circumcised penis"). GILMAN,
supra note 227, at 5.
2. GIULAN, supra note 227, at 40.
21 GILIAN, supra note 227, at 52 (quoting a "standard textbook of German ra-
cial eugenics," ENScLIcHE ERBLEHRE UND RASSENHYGIENE: 1 : MENSCHUCHE
ERBLEHRE 396 (Erwin Baur et al. eds., 1936)).
22 GILMAN, supra note 227, at 52.
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was the hallmark of all of the liberal movements of the mid-century.
The Jew's foot marked him... as congenitally unable and, there-
fore, unworthy of being completely integrated into the social fabric
of the modern state."'
The persistence throughout Western history of discrimina-
tion against Jews rooted in malevolent imagery should prompt
suspicion about the emergence of such imagery in modern
genetics.2 A mode of discourse constructed around the no-
tion of DNA and fueled by genetic facts and metaphors can
clearly be used for racist ends (vis-a-vis Jews and other groups
identified with distinct genetic alterations). Whether that will
occur depends in significant part on how society will envision
the individual person, and on how it will understand the rela-
tion between individuals and larger groups. Ironically, the new
genetics may itself facilitate and encourage shifts in social
understandings of personhood that will undermine some of the
social mechanisms that now limit and discourage genetic dis-
crimination."45
IV. THE "GENETIc" INDIVIDUAL AND THE "GENETIC" GROUP:
ELABORATING AN IDEOLOGY OF GENETIC INHERITANCE
The law has not yet considered many cases that involve
discrimination against ethnic groups in genetic terms.246
However, a number of cases and commentaries about the use
of genetic information in familial contexts are suggestive of
how the law may respond to such discrimination because
American culture has long understood familial and ethnic
groups in analogous terms.
In 1969, the anthropologist David Schneider defined an
ideological universe that encompassed relationships within
diverse groups. 47 Schneider did not directly address the case
243 GILMAN, supra note 227, at 39-40.
'" Prince-Gibson, supra note 202 (noting media descriptions of Jews as genetic
mutants).
2" See infra notes 254-259 and accompanying text (describing shifting under-
standing of personhood facilitated by new genetics).
'" See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260, 1264
(9th Cir. 1998) (allowing application of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
employer's screening of African-American employees for sickle-cell trait).
247 David M. Schneider, Kinship, Nationality, and Religion in American Culture:
Toward a Definition of Kinship, in SYMBOLIC ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER IN THE
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of ethnic groups, but they could easily be considered within the
broad analytic scheme that he presented. Schneider showed
that, within American culture, relations among family mem-
bers were structured in the same terms as relationships among
members of religious and national groups.248 Within each of
these apparently distinct domains, social relationships were
predicated on an assumed "unity of substance" (e.g., blood,
land), and on the assumption of a unifying sentiment (e.g.,
love, patriotism).249
An ideological frame within which contemporary genetics
can be used to define apparently distinct social units (families,
ethnic groups) in similar terms long predated the decoding of
the human genome and, more specifically, predated practical
concerns about discriminatory uses of genetic information. For
at least two centuries, a far-reaching ideology of relationships
within American culture has encouraged familial and ethnic
loyalties and, at the same time, antipathy to those defined as
Other."
Schneider identified the ideological grounding of a long-
standing tendency within the culture to perceive various sorts
of identities and communal relationships through similar
forms." However, contemporary understandings of relation-
ships within American culture differ in several significant
regards from those described by Schneider in the 1960s. In
particular, the balance between what Schneider referred to as
relationships of "natural substance" ("blood") and what he
referred to as relationships "as code for conduct,"" has shift-
STUDY OF SYMBOLS AND MEANINGS 63 (Janet L. Dolgin et al. eds., 1977).
248 See id. at 70.
249 More specifically, Schneider argued:
If we consider only the "pure" domain of kinship and treat this as a
system of diffuse, enduring solidarity, it seems possible that what is
called "nationality" and "religion" are defined and structured in identical
terms, namely, in terms of the dual aspects of relationship as natural
substance and relationship as code for conduct, and that most if not all
of the major diacritical marks which are found in kinship are also found
in nationality and religion.
Id. at 70-71.
210 See LOUIS DUMONT, HOMO HIERARCHIcUS: AN ESSAY ON THE CASTE SYSTEM
239-58 (Mark Sainsbury trans., 1970) (analyzing ideology of racism in the United
States).
" See Schneider, supra note 247, at 65.
252 Id.
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ed widely during the last several decades. Increased emphasis
on the centrality of the autonomous individual, and on that
individual's right of choice in communal (including familial)
settings, has reduced the significance of relationships as "natu-
ral substance" in familial, national, and other communal set-
tingsY3 The availability of genetic testing and the prolifera-
tion of genetic information produce a strikingly contrary ef-
fect--one that minimizes the importance of relationships
grounded in "code-for-conduct" and provides for a more exclu-
sive stress on relationships grounded in "natural substance."
Thus, American culture is undergoing a broad fragmentation of
the ideology that has long defined relationships within groups
defined by reference to natural substance. Increasingly, Ameri-
can society defines kinship differently for different purposes.
The anthropologist Kaja Finkler concludes her study of the
conjunction of the new genetics and American kinship by com-
menting on a disassociation between genes, as the "natural
substance" that delimits familial groups, and the actual experi-
ence of being related to others as kin:
With the ideology of genetic inheritance and the medicalization of
kinship, interaction with family and kin may no longer be required
in order for people to recognize relatedness and connection .... [In
the past, the family was identified by honor, status, power, or even
poverty, whereas in contemporary times family and kin tend to be
stabilized and bounded by the sharing of DNA molecules, which lack
the moral responsibilities associated with relatedness.
Phenomenologically there is a distinction between experiencing
oneself as a member of a significant same group, which feels a sense
of unity and relatedness associated with shared experiences from
the beginning of life, and experiencing oneself as a member of a
group that shares DNA molecules, which are not easily discernible.
The notion of shared experiences suggests being in the world and
interacting with others, whereas being part of the same DNA circle
requires no social interaction."4
In a world defined through amoral DNA, differences and
similarities between individuals and their genetic groups are
defined only in biological terms. No rules about the character
and scope of communal relationships balance the fact of shared
213 See, e.g., JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE FAIILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND
REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 14-31 (1997) (summarizing transformation of
American family during early decades of twentieth century).
254 FINKLER, supra note 48, at 206.
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genes. The genetic family (or the genetic ethnic group) is de-
fined exclusively with reference to a genome. In consequence,
the locus of social value shifts from the individual to groups of
apparently fungible individuals, and the autonomous individu-
al, constructed through, and understood in terms of, Enlighten-
ment values, ceases to be essential. Moreover, the view that
genes are shared substance and information"I facilitates de-
personalization. The genetic "substance" taken to define each
person is also collapsed into a network of information that
defines the group exactly as it defines the person and that
defines every person exactly as it defines each other person. A
universe predicated on the notion of a genetic group would
view the preservation of autonomy, and the protection of the
individual, with indifference. And in such a universe, social,
and presumably legal, protections now afforded the individual
person-protections, for instance, of privacy, equality, and
choice-would also become matters of indifference.
The possibility that such a universe is evolving is evident
in the discussion, to which we now turn, of institutional re-
sponses to some of the questions presented by the use, and
potential abuse, especially within familial contexts, of genetic
information. The discussion focuses first on the implications of
genetic information in familial contexts, more than ethnic or
racial contexts, because these contexts have been subjected to
professional consideration and legal analysis."6 A number of
litigated cases involving the obligations of physicians to protect
or reveal genetic information about patients, several legal
commentaries, and at least one professional society's statement
on disclosure of genetic information" suggest a remarkable
2- See MARILYN STRATHERN, THOUGHT EXPEIMENTS 19 (1998) (draft in posses-
sion of author) (noting that "in popular parlance [genes] are both substance (the
'blood' that is inherited) and information (codes for saying how cells will develop)").
... Even in the context of family settings, there are only a few cases that deal
directly with the use of genetic information. See infra Part IV.A. Direct testing for
genetic alterations is a recent phenomenon. Thus, concern with the use of such
testing and with the information it reveals is likely to increase in familial and in
other sorts of contexts. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 89, at 506 (noting that con-
sequences of new genetics for insurance consumers and insurance industry remain
conjectural, and quoting Ohio Task Force on Genetic Testing, Final Report iii-iv
(Dec. 31, 1995), concluding that "[i]nsurers will not use genetic tests, if ever, until
such tests are in common use").
25 The American Society of Human Genetics Social Issues Subcommittee on
Familial Disclosure, ASHG Statement: Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic
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shift in understandings of personhood and of relationships
among people in settings defined through reference to genetic
information.
More particularly, courts, legal commentators, and others,
considering the implications of genetic information for individ-
uals and for groups, have begun to assume, and to counte-
nance, the "genetic family" as a social and legal construction.
And by implication they have also begun to assume, and to
countenance, genetic ethnic,258 racial, and national groups as
constructs. 9 These constructs depend on, and further en-
courage, the emergence of an ideology that deconstructs
personhood, as understood in the West at least since the En-
lightenment, and that (more importantly) could threaten the
political and legal structures that seem best able to protect
against the use of genetic information in the service of discrim-
inatory ends.
A. Constructing a "Genetic Family"
Some of the ramifications of an ideology of genetic inheri-
tance are suggested by the assumptions underlying two cas-
es,60 both decided in the 1990s, the statement on "disclosure
of familial genetic information" of the American Society of Hu-
man Genetics,26' and a few published proposals for legal re-
form.
In the first of the two cases, Pate v. Threlkel,262 the Flori-
da Supreme Court was, in effect, asked by the plaintiff to rec-
Information, 62 AM. J. HUM. GENET. 474 (1998) [hereinafter ASHG Statement]. See
infra notes 296-305 and accompanying text (describing and summarizing this state-
ment).
2" See infra notes 328-329 and accompanying text (considering ethnic and racial
groups).
"9 Hrobjartur Jonatansson, Iceland's Health Sector Database: A Significant Head
Start in the Search for the Biological Grail or an Irreversible Error, 26 AM. J.L. &
MED. 31 (considering potential consequences of 1998 decision of Iceland's Parlia-
ment to permit the development of a Health Sector Database to collect genetic in-
formation about the national population).
2" Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Pate v.
Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 1995).
261 The American Society of Human Genetics Social Issues Subcommittee on
Familial Disclosure, Professional Disclosure of Familial Genetic Information, 62 AM.
J. HUM. GENET. 474 (1998).
262 661 So. 2d 278.
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ognize a genetic family as a legal unit, but it refrained from
acceding completely to that request. In the second case, Safer
v. Pack,2' a New Jersey appellate court recognized such a
family. In doing so, the court delineated the ideological con-
tours of a universe grounded on novel understandings of priva-
cy, individuality, and of the ties that link people to one anoth-
er.
Pate v. Threlkel21' was commenced in the early 1990s by
Heidi Pate, who claimed that Dr. James Threlkel, the physi-
cian of Pate's mother, Marianne New, was obliged to warn
New that she suffered from a hereditary disease (medullary
thyroid carcinoma) that placed her children (including Pate) at
risk for the same disorderY.2 5 At the time of suit, Pate, who
had indeed fallen ill with the cancer, claimed that had she
been warned about the hereditary risk in 1987, when Dr.
Threlkel first treated her mother for thyroid cancer, her own
condition would have been discovered in a timely fashion and
might well have been curable. 266 The Florida Supreme Court
decided that Dr. Threlkel had a duty to warn New about the
hereditary implications of her disease, and that the duty ex-
tended to Heidi, as well as to her mother.267 Thus, the court
recognized a duty owed by the doctor to his patient's child to
provide information about the consequences for that child of
the patient's genetic condition, even though the doctor had
never treated that child.
Threlkel was not unprecedented, 28 and the decision did
not impose a duty on Dr. Threlkel to warn Heidi directly. A
2'3 677 A.2d 1188.
26 661 So. 2d 278.
265 Id. at 279.
266 Id.
217 Id. at 280-82.
26 Threlkel follows a line of cases, all decided outside Florida, that impose a
duty on healthcare workers to warn third-parties. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345-47 (Cal. 1976) (imposing duty on psychothera-
pist to warn intended victim of a patient's murder intentions); Bradshaw v. Dan-
iel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 872 (Tenn. 1993) (imposing duty on physician to warn
patient's wife that she was at risk of becoming ill with Rocky Mountain Spotted
Fever, from which disease patient died; suit was commenced by patient's step-son
after death of his mother from the illness); see also L.J. Deftos, Genomic Torts:
The Law of the Future-the Duty of Physicians to Disclose the Presence of a Genet-
ic Disease to the Relatives of Their Patients with the Disease, 32 U.S.F. L. REV.
105, 111-29 (1997) (reviewing cases imposing a "duty to warn").
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warning to Heidi's mother would have sufficed. The court
wrote:
To require the physician to seek out and warn various members of
the patient's family would often be difficult or impractical and would
place too heavy a burden upon the physician. Thus, we emphasize
that in any circumstances in which the physician has a duty to warn
of a genetically transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by
warning the patient.269
The New Jersey court that decided Safer v. Pack v. im-
posed just such a duty on the physician-defendant. The facts of
Safer resemble those of Threlkel. In 1990, Donna Safer, then
thirty-six years old, was diagnosed with a hereditary form of
colon cancer from which her father, Robert Batkin, had died
twenty-six years earlier."' In 1992, Donna commenced suit
against Dr. George Pack, the physician who had treated her
father during his last illness.2 Dr. Pack never treated Don-
na or served as her physician in any way.7 Yet, Donna, in
effect, asserted that Dr. Pack had provided her with negligent
medical care. 4 In particular, Donna argued that Dr. Pack
was obliged "to warn those at risk" that his patient's condition
was hereditary,275 "so that they might have the benefits of
early examination, monitoring, detection and treatment, and
thus, the opportunity to avoid the most baneful consequences
of the condition."276
Ida Batkin, Donna Safer's mother and Robert Batkin's
wife, testified at trial that Dr. Pack had informed her that his
patient suffered from a "blockage" and an "infection."277 Ida
asserted that when she asked Dr. Pack whether her husband's
" Threlkel, 661 So. 2d at 292.
270 677 A.2d 1188.
271 Id. at 1190.
272 Id.
213 Id.
274 Id.
' Robert Batkin was diagnosed with adenocarcinoma. The pathology report
issued at the time of Batkin's first operation for colon cancer in 1956 indicated
the existence of diffuse intestinal polyposis. This condition is hereditary and leads
to colon cancer. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint at 4, 7, Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d
1188 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (No. A2234-94T2). I am grateful to Gary
Maher, attorney for Donna Safer, and Ms. Safer's husband, Robert Safer, for send-
ing this complaint to the Hofstra Law Library.
2 Safer, 677 A.2d at 1190.
217 Id.
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condition presented a danger to her two young children, Dr.
Pack told her "not to worry."27 ' The trial court, considering a
motion for summary judgment, assumed that Dr. Pack had
told no one of the hereditary character of Robert's illness, but
dismissed Donna's complaint because "there was no physician-
patient relationship between Dr. Pack and his patient's daugh-
ter Donna."279
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court" ° reversed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Dr.
Pack."1 The court rejected the limited duty to warn imposed
by the Florida supreme court in Threlkel. That court required
Dr. Threlkel to warn his patient (but not, directly, to warn
members of that patient's family) of the hereditary character of
the patient's medical condition. 2 Instead, the Safer court de-
fined a broad duty to warn not only the patient, but also di-
rectly to warn those members of the patient's family at risk of
falling ill with the hereditary illness at issue. Judge Kestin,
writing for the court, explained:
Although an overly broad and general application of the physician's
duty to warn might lead to confusion, conflict or unfairness in many
types of circumstances, we are confident that the duty to warn of
avertible risk from genetic causes, by definition a matter of familial
concern, is sufficiently narrow to serve the interests of justice. Fur-
ther, it is appropriate ... that the duty be seen as owed not only to
the patient himself but that it also "extends beyond the interests of
a patient to members of the immediate family of the patient who
may be adversely affected by a breach of that duty." We need not
decide, in the present posture of this case, how, precisely, that duty
is to be discharged, especially with respect to young children who
may be at risk, except to require that reasonable steps be taken to
assure that the information reaches those likely to be affected or is
made available for their benefit.2
278 Id.
279 Id.
... The appeal before the superior court involved a motion for summary judge-
ment. Thus, the court accepted Donna Safer's claim that the prevailing standard of
medical care at the time that Dr. Batkin cared for her father "required the physi-
cian to warn of the known genetic threat." Id. at 1191.
281 Dr. Pack had died in 1969. The plaintiffs thus brought suit against Dr.
Pack's estate. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1190.
282 Id. at 1191.
293 Id. at 1192 (citing Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834, 839 (N.J. 1981)).
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The court was explicit. In its view, the duty to warn in cases
involving hereditary disorders should not always be limited to
warning the patient, who, once informed, might-or might
not-communicate that information to relevant family mem-
bers. Judge Kestin explained:
We decline to hold as the Florida Supreme Court did in Pate v.
Threlkel... that, in all circumstances, the duty to warn will be
satisfied by informing the patient. It may be necessary, at some
stage, to resolve a conflict between the physician's broader duty to
warn and his fidelity to an expressed preference of the patient that
nothing be said to family members about the details of the dis-
ease.
284
Finally, the court suggested that even if Robert Batkin had
asked his doctor to refrain from informing his family about the
nature of his illness, the law might impose a duty to reveal on
the doctor, "especially after the patient's death where a risk of
harm survives the patient."'
Other courts (both in New Jersey and elsewhere-inclu-
ding the Florida court that decided Threlkel)-have found
exceptions to the requirement that a suit against a healthcare
provider for negligence depends on the plaintiff being in a
relation of privity with the provider. Two decades before Safer
was decided, courts in a number of jurisdictions began to rec-
ognize the right of third parties to be informed by health care
workers about otherwise confidential matters concerning a
patient. That right has generally been predicated on a foresee-
able harm that might have been, but was not, avoided by reve-
lation of confidential information concerning a patient.2' For
instance, in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,
the California Supreme Court held a psychotherapist liable for
failing to warn Tatiana Tarasoff or her parents that Prosenjit
Poddar, one of the therapist's patients, intended to kill the
girl.8 ' In fact, Poddar murdered the unsuspecting
24 Id. at 1192-93.
283 Id. at 1193.
284 See supra note 268. The cases in note 268 are considered in several law
review articles and student notes. See, e.g., Alissa Brownrigg, Note, Mother Still
Knows Best: Cancer-Related Gene Mutations and a Physicians Duty to Warn, 26
FoRD. URB. L.J. 247 (1999); Jeffrey R. Burnett, Comment, A Physician's Duty to
Warn a Patient's Relatives of a Patient's Genetically Inheritable Disease, 36 Hous.
L. REV. 559 (1999). See also generally Deftos, supra note 268.
2- 551 P.2d 334, 345-46 (Cal. 1976) (imposing duty on psychotherapist to warn
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Tarasoff. 8' The reasoning of Tarasoff has been applied in
other contexts. A number of courts, both before and after
Tarasoff, have imposed a similar duty on health care providers
to warn those in contact with a patient suffering from a conta-
gious disease." 9 And in Bradshaw v. Daniel,290 the Tennes-
see Supreme Court held a physician liable for failing to warn a
patient's wife that she might have been exposed to the same
agent that caused the non-contagious disease (Rocky Mountain
Spotted Fever) from which her husband suffered and died.29'
Finally, in a 1981 case that resembles Safer, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held defendant-doctors legally at fault
for failing to inform a pediatric patient's parents about the
hereditary implications of the patient's condition (cystic fibro-
sis).292 In Schroeder v. Perkel, a New Jersey court reasoned
that the doctors' duty followed from the harm that might befall
the patient's parents were they to conceive a second child,
unaware that the second child might also suffer from cystic
fibrosis. 3 Despite the similarities between the facts of
Schroeder and those of Safer, the implications of the two cases
differ significantly. Both cases require a physician to reveal
third parties of foreseeable harm in cases in which there is special relationship
between therapist and patient or therapist and victim).
"' Id. at 342-43. The duty to warn described in Tarasoff was codified in Cali-
fornia statutory law. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp. 1997) (imposing
duty in cases in which "the patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a
serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or vic-
tims"). Id. § 43.92(a).
28 See, e.g., Gammill v. United States, 727 F.2d 950, 954 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding a doctor may be liable "for failing to warn a patient's family, treating
attendants, or other persons likely to be exposed to the patient, of the nature of
the disease and the danger of exposure"); Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 18
Misc.2d 740, 745, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351, 357 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1959) (imposing
duty to warn wife of patient with tuberculosis of contagious nature of patient's ill-
ness).
854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993).
291 Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever is contracted from a tick bite. The patient
and his wife had been on a camping trip together. The wife in fact became ill
with the disease, from which she, like her husband, died. The case was com-
menced by the wife's son. Id. at 867.
2"3 Schroeder v. Perkel, 432 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1981).
2'3 Id. at 839-40. In fact, the parents, Marion and John Schroeder, unaware of
the hereditary implications of their daughter's illness, had a second child who, like
his sister, suffered from cystic fibrosis. Id. at 836.
At the time, cystic fibrosis could not be detected in a fetus, but could be
diagnosed in a baby through a method known as a "sweat test." Id.
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confidential information to a patient's close family member,
but the context of each case distinguishes it from the other. To
order a pediatrician to tell a patient's parents about the impli-
cations of that patient's illness is far less surprising and less
disruptive of basic cultural assumptions than to require a
physician to reveal confidential information about a patient's
illness to the patient's children (or siblings and other collateral
relatives). In the range of disclosure mandated, the holding in
Safer29 is unprecedented. Not surprisingly, it remains con-
troversial."5
The essential message of the holding in Safer is reflected
in a 1998 Statement of the American Society of Human Genet-
ics ("ASHG")."' The ASHG proposed granting health care
providers the "discretionary right"2 97 to contravene rules that
normally protect patient confidentiality in certain cases involv-
ing patients with hereditary conditions.29 "[The principle of
confidentiality is not absolute," the Society stated, "and, in
294 The case was remanded and tried to a jury in late 1999. The jury held for
the defendant. No written decision was handed down by the court. Gary Maher,
one of the plaintiffs attorneys, explained that, in his view, the decision was based
on evidence presented at trial that Donna Safer did, in fact, know about the risk
of falling ill with the illness from which her father died. See E-mail from Connie
Lenz, Assistant Director, Maurice A. Deane Law Library, Hofstra University School
of Law, to author (Oct. 6, 1999, 16:28 CST) (on file with author). In particular,
evidence was presented showing that Donna Safer had probably been examined for
evidence of colon cancer, even as a very young girl. The superior court, which held
for Donna Safer, noted the possibility that Donna had, in effect, been warned as a
child. Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1193 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1996). The
court noted the "possible existence of some offsetting evidence that Donna was
rectally examined as a young child, suggesting that the risk to her had been dis-
closed." Id.
295 The more far-reaching implications of Safer were rejected by the New Jersey
legislature in 1996. In that year, the state legislature passed a statute concerned
with protecting genetic privacy-. Under this law, health care workers are only al-
lowed to warn relatives of those suffering from genetic disorders if the patient has
consented to the disclosure or if the patient has died. Genetic Privacy Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN § 17B:30-12 (West 1998); see also Bob Groves, New Jersey Has Yet to
Implement Genetic Privacy Law: Health-Care Community Awaiting State Confidenti-
ality Regulations, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), May 29, 1998, at A5, avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, NJrec File.
296 ASHG Statement, supra note 257, at 474.
297 Id. at 474.
298 The duty outlined in the Society's ASHG Statement, supra note 257, to pro-
vide a patient's family members with genetic information, is discretionary. In this
regard the ASHG Statement differs from Safer which suggests a mandatory duty
to disclose, at least in certain cases. See 677 A.2d 1188.
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exceptional cases, ethical, legal, and statutory obligations may
permit health-care professionals to disclose otherwise confiden-
tial information."299 Those cases are delimited by two sets of
"exceptional circumstances."
[First, are cases] where attempts to encourage disclosure on the part
of the patient have failed; where the harm is highly likely to occur
and is serious and foreseeable; where the at-risk relative(s) is identi-
fiable; and where either the disease is preventable/treatable or medi-
cally accepted standards indicate that early monitoring will reduce
the genetic risk."0 '
Second, in cases in which disclosure is permitted, "[t]he harm
that may result from failure to disclose should outweigh the
harm that may result from disclosure." 0' The Society defined
"at-risk relatives" to whom disclosure should be permitted in
such cases to include a patient's children and siblings, as well
as a patient's "identifiable parents, cousins, aunts and uncles,
whom the health-care professional can reasonably contact."3 2
Safer,"3 and the position espoused by the ASHG, °4
suggest a far-reaching redefinition of family privacy.' Both
assume a genetic family, defined exclusively through reference
to a shared genome, understood to reflect familial DNA. This
redefinition presumes that each person replicates every other
person and the larger whole. Thus, individuals and the larger
whole are defined in terms of the genome that establishes their
shared identity.
29 ASHG Statement, supra note 257, at 474.
300 Id.
30 Id.
' Id. The Society further noted that the majority of foreign jurisdictions ap-
prove of "limited disclosure of genetic test results (without the consent of the pa-
tient) in cases where the harm to at-risk relatives is grave and imminent and
where the disclosure of information could result in effect intervention." Id. at 475-
76. Among the groups said to follow this position are the "World Health Organiza-
tion, Council of Europe, Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Health Council of the Neth-
erlands, and Privacy Commissioner of Australia." "Only a few," the Statement con-
tinues, "maintain that confidentiality is absolute and that the patient's wishes with
regard to non-disclosure must be respected at all times." These groups and coun-
tries are said to include "Norway, Swiss Academy of Medical Sciences, and possi-
bly France's National Ethics Committee. ASHG Statement, supra note 257, at 476.
3'3 766 A.2d 1188.
"' See supra note 298.
... See supra note 298 (noting difference between requirement of disclosure sug-
gested in Safer and Statement's proposed "right" to disclose).
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This construction of family and its consequences are im-
plicit in Safer and at least arguably explicit in the statement of
the ASHG. A note in that statement, clarifying the suggestion
that genetic information may be viewed as a "family possession
rather than simply a personal one,""°6 explains, "[Wachbroit]
suggests a family-health model that contemplates the
physician's patient as the entire family; 'family' is understood
to refer to a genetic network rather than a social institution.
Therefore, the physician's duties pertain to the genetic family
as a whole." °'
'" ASHG Statement, supra note 257, at 476 (quoting DOROTHY WERTZ ET AL.,
GUIDELINES ON ETHICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL-GENETICS AND THE PROVISION OF GE-
NETIC SERVICES (1995)).
30 ASHG Statement, supra note 257, at 476 n.1 (citing Robert Wachbroit, Bio-
medical Technology, Ethics, Public Policy, and the Law: Rethinking Medical Confi-
dentiality: The Impact of Genetics, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1391 (1993) [hereinafter
Wachbroit, Biomedical Technology] (Wachbroit's article is cited incorrectly in the
Society's statement, ASHG Statement, supra note 257, at 476 n.1)); see also Robert
Wachbroit, Who is the Patient?: A Moral Problem, 38 MD. MED. J. 557 (1989).
In a subsequent article, Wachbroit presents the following hypothetical case: A
woman discovers that she is a carrier for the X-linked gene for Duchenne Muscu-
lar Dystrophy ("DMD"). Wachbroit, Biomedical Technology, supra, at 1395-96. She
will not become ill with the disease, but if she has a son, he could become ill
with the disease. Wachbroit, Biomedical Technology, supra, at 1396. Wachbroit
further hypothesizes that tlie woman has a sister, who has a fifty percent chance
of carrying the genetic alteration in question. He continues:
The [genetic] counselor wishes to inform the sister of her condition, since
it might affect her reproductive plans, but the woman forbids it. The
family has had a terrible falling-out, and the woman now sees withhold-
ing the information as a way of taking revenge on her sister. She there-
fore insists that her right to confidentiality be respected.
Wachbroit, Biomedical Technology, supra, at 1396. In thinking about this case,
Wachbroit suggests relying on an "alternative framework" to one that focuses on
the question of confidentiality, per se. This alternative framework involves redefin-
ing the "patient." He explains:
Allowing for the possibility that the patient may be more than just an
individual does not amount to jettisoning the duty of medical confidenti-
ality. ... [T]he idea of privacy can be applied to more than just indi-
viduals. For example, a health professional's duty might be to respect the
privacy of a family, rather than that of an individual. Indeed, by expand-
ing the concept of "patient," it is possible to retain much of the structure
of the standard approach to confidentiality ....
Wachbroit, Biomedical Technology, supra, at 1402.
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This remarkable construction of family is further assumed
by a recent law review comment3 " that proposes, at least in
certain contexts, that physicians be allowed, or even obliged, to
inform a patient's family members that the patient suffers (or
died) from a hereditary condition.0 9 The implicit assumptions
that underlie the comment underscore the implications of Saf-
er. The comment dismisses concerns about patient confidenti-
ality by, in effect, assuming the preeminence of the genetic
family, within which individual identity is subsumed by the
identity of the whole:
[T]here is no need to consider confidentiality in the genetic context
because, arguably, confidentiality is not sacrificed.
Confidentiality is not in danger because, even assuming that
policies in favor of confidentiality outweigh a duty to warn, a duty of
confidentiality is not violated in the situation involving the warning
of genetic diseases. The Safer court mentioned that by their very
nature, genetic diseases are a familial concern.31
"Now," the comment continues, "with the introduction of ge-
netic mapping.., the patient/physician relationship has been
reconfigured to reflect the individual's ties to his or her ances-
tors and descendants."31' And so, the comment concludes:
[It would seem that if a doctor warns a patient's at-risk relatives
(which is really the "multitude" of family) of a patient's genetic disor-
der, the patient's interest in keeping the information confidential is
not sacrificed. This new analysis of the duty of confidentiality dem-
onstrates that, arguably, such a duty does not pose a barrier to the
duty to warn of genetic defects.312
Rules of confidentiality are moot when individuals are
indistinguishable from one another. In effect, in the implicit
view of the comment, the right to privacy is simply inapplica-
ble to a genetic family. To claim otherwise, this comment sug-
gests, would be to presume erroneously that the autonomous
individual, to whom rules of medical confidentiality apply, has
survived the redefinition of personhood that attends the suc-
cesses of the new genetics, including the mapping of a "human
genome."31 a The ease with which the comment dismisses con-
0 Burnett, supra note 286.
a" Burnett, supra note 286, at 563.
310 Burnett, supra note 286, at 577-78.
311 Burnett, supra note 286, at 578.
312 Burnett, supra note 286, at 578 (emphasis added).
... In fact, the comment, published in 1999, precedes by one year the an-
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cern about patient confidentiality " (and thus privacy) sug-
gests a society prepared to embrace the redefinition of family
that undergirds Safer.
The notion of patient-as-family (regardless of the wishes
and needs of individuals) implies that the family understood as
a "genetic network" can be distinguished from the family un-
derstood as a "social institution." As a theoretical matter, such
a distinction may be drawn, but as a practical matter it is
illusory. Requiring or encouraging health care workers to tell
family members about one another's medical diagnoses and
about their implications will inevitably alter relations among
those involved. As Kaja Finkler shows in detail in her anthro-
pological study of people's responses to information about the
hereditary conditions of family members, genetic information
almost invariably "influences day-to-day experience" for fami-
lies.315 Moreover, defining families through genetic informa-
tion displaces a moral frame with the amorality of DNA."6
As the British anthropologist Marilyn Strathern explains, "Ge-
netic information which appears to extract relatedness from
relationships simultaneously encourages people to seek out far
flung connections-which may or may not be turned back into
active relationships. The point is that they do not have to
be.)
3 17
B. The Implications of the "Genetic Family" and the "Genetic
Ethnic Group"
For members of a genetic family or a genetic ethnic group,
the implications of defining people and groups of people
nouncement that a preliminary draft of the human genome had been completed. In
1999, however, it was clear that the announcement was soon to be forthcoming.
See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Gene Map is on Fast Track; Millions in Grants Speed Up
Project, WASH. POST, Mar. 16, 1999, at A19, available at 1999 WL 2205533 (pre-
dicting completion of Human Genome Project earlier than 2003, "the previously
announced deadline").
.. See Burnett, supra note 286, at 578 (concluding that the holding in Safer
does not endanger confidentiality because the doctor/patient relationship has "been
reconfigured to reflect the individual's ties to his or her ancestors and descen-
dante").
315 FINKLER, supra note 48, at 175.
316 FINKLER, supra note 48, at 206.
317 MARILYN STRATHERN, EMERGENT PROPERTIES: NEW TECHNOLOGIES, NEW PER-
SONS, NEW CLAIMS 23 (draft in possession of author) (emphasis added).
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through reference to a genome are startling. Individuality,
with all that it implies, is replaced by a notion of persons as
indistinguishable from one another, and from the group they
compose.
1. The Genetic Family
The family defined through DNA is an amoral unit that
contrasts dramatically with both the traditional family of the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-centuries 18 and with the
more modern "family-by-choice" 19 that developed in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century."' Within the traditional
family, the locus of value (and thus of privacy) is a hierarchi-
cal, holistic unit, represented by the pater familias. Within the
more modern "family-by-choice," the locus of value is the indi-
vidual, who relates to others "as family" because he or she
chooses to do so (and not because biology and custom define
"family").
Within the traditional family, relations of status (delimited
largely through differences in gender and age) distinguish
individual family members from one another and define their
relationships, as well as the manner in which outsiders are
expected to interact with family members.32" ' Within the mod-
"' The so-called "traditional" family was constructed in the nineteenth century,
largely as a product of industrial capitalism. See JOHN DEMOS, PAST PRESENT AND
PERSONAL: THE FAMILY AND THE LIFE COURSE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 30-31 (1986).
"' See WESTON, supra note 9, at 213. Weston concludes that families-by-choice
should not be imagined in complete opposition to traditional families. Rather, she
explains, families-by-choice "undercut procreation's status as a master term imag-
ined to provide the template for all possible kinship relations." See WESTON, supra
note 9, at 213.
.. A fuller consideration of these contrasts is found in Janet L. Dolgin, Choice,
Tradition, and the New Genetics: The Fragmentation of the Ideology of Family, 32
CONN L. REV. 523 (2000).
2' Throughout the nineteenth- and much of the twentieth-century, family law in
the United States reflected this view of family. The law's commitment to safe-
guarding "family privacy" (generally actualized as the privacy of the family's pater
familias) represented that position. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336,
342 (Neb. 1963) (refusing to intervene in dispute between spouses in which wife
alleged husband did not adequately provide for her). The law reflected this view
as well in medical contexts. Husbands, for instance, were privy to knowledge about
their wives. See, e.g., Tooley v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 154 So.2d 617,
618 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (finding physician and insurance companies not obligated
to protect a woman's medical privacy from her husband's purview). The husband,
explained the Tooley court, is "head and master of the community," and thus, his
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ern family, the locus of value is the autonomous individual,
whose continued inclusion within the family is viewed largely,
though not exclusively, as a matter of choice. Both varieties of
family" imply a moral frame that establishes rules for gov-
erning relationships between family members, and between
family members and others. By contrast, the unit of value
within the genetic family can variously be identified as individ-
ual family members-indistinguishable from one another--or
the larger genetic whole, itself defined as indistinguishable
from the individuals who compose it. The genetic family, thus
described, is an emerging ideological construct.
And at the heart of the construct is the obliteration of
privacy. Regardless of how genetic families are delimited and
of how relationships within them are actualized, those identi-
fied within a genetic family have no clear right to privacy vis-
a-vis one another because, from the perspective of the genetic
family, they are indistinguishable. For members of a genetic
family, privacy is not protected either by the pater familias,
who safeguarded the communal whole that was the traditional
family, or by the right of individual family members to choose
to remain private that pertains within the modern family-by-
choice.
Within the genetic family, each unit (each individual) is
privileged to learn the others' secrets because each is, in effect,
identical to-literally consubstantial with--each other. So, for
instance, for Dr. Pack to tell Donna Safer about her father's
illness is, in effect, only to tell her about herself. Within the
relevant "genetic" frame, nothing distinguishes the daughter
from her father. The amorality of the genetic family is implied
by a single decisive fact: A shared genome. For those identified
wife's medical secrets cannot be private from him. Id. Ironically, the court's ruling
in Tooley helped the husband divorce his wife. See Deftos, supra note 268, at 113
(discussing Tooley); see also Curry v. Corn, 277 N.Y.S.2d 470, 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1966) (recognizing physician's right to reveal medical information to patient's hus-
band). Curry is considered in Deftos, supra note 268, at 113.
3" To some extent, the differentiation suggested here, between traditional and
modern families, misleadingly reifies the central dynamic that has defined the
family in the West for more than two centuries. Families, in fact, are under-
stood-and openly debated-in light of what society takes to be "traditional" and
"modern" options. That notwithstanding, families are defined here as "traditional"
and "modern" to more clearly demonstrate the conceptual difference between the
genetic family and virtually all other understandings of family.
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as belonging to a genetic family, no particular (familial) re-
sponse is required. Various responses may develop, but the fact
of the genetic relationship necessitates none of them. Members
of a genetic family may, for instance, love one another and act
like social kin, but nothing in the meaning or construction of
the genetic family requires that they do so."
As Marilyn Strathern explains, to constitute a genetic
family, "nothing else need be known about the relationship
between parent and child than the fact that the body of one
held or holds information which could be useful to the oth-
er."324 The relational consequences of such information for
those labeled as "family" are unspecified, and thus may vary
widely.3" The fact of the genetic connection suggests no mor-
al frame within which genetic family members interact. Genet-
ic connections imply nothing about the dimensions of actual
relationships among those defined as genetic kin. Kaja Finkler
remarks in the conclusion to her study of the medicalization
(or, more specifically, the geneticization) of kinship: "To sense
that one forms part of a family chiefly because one shares the
same genes, requiring no social participation nor sense of re-
sponsibility to those who are related except to provide blood
samples for testing purposes, removes the moral context of
family relationships."32
Other consequences of defining families through genetic
kinship are similarly staggering. For example, the rights and
responsibilities that attend the notion of the autonomous indi-
vidual may be destroyed. More particularly, the individual
whose interests are protected in the Bill of Rights may be
among the central victims of the construction of a genetic fami-
ly. As rules of confidentiality can be deemed moot in the con-
text of a genetic family, so rules that protect privacy, equality,
and liberty may be rendered irrelevant. Moreover, one does not
choose whether or not to affiliate with a genetic family. Thus,
the genetic family may eviscerate choice, a central element in
the modern family.327 No one can choose to avoid the fact or
'3 See FINKLER, supra note 48, at 57-172 (describing social experiences of mem-
bers of genetic families).
324 STRATHERN, supra note 317, at 21.
"~ See FINKLER, supra note 48, at 57-172 (providing ethnographic description of
individual's experience of the "ideology of genetic inheritance").
12 FINKLER, supra note 48, at 206-07.
'" One may choose to relate to members of one's genetic family in various
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consequences of belonging to a genetic family. These implica-
tions of the genetic family suggest that the development of an
ideology of genetic inheritance may signal a fundamentally
new social order within which personhood, as understood with-
in American culture for two centuries, could be utterly trans-
formed.
2. The Genetic Ethnic Group
Ethnic and racial groups may also be profoundly affected
by the notion of a genetic family. Throughout American histo-
ry, these groups, understood as socially constructed, have, like
families, been described through metaphors of natural sub-
stances such as blood.y In a universe that delimits people
through genes, the ideology of the genetic family is mirrored in
the ideology of other groups, delimited through reference to
natural substance. In all these cases, many of the social impli-
cations of geneticization stem from a focus on natural sub-
stance (DNA) to the exclusion of social and behavioral corre-
lates that might channel the implications of relationship-
through-DNA.
In addition, the notion of genes, not only as sub-
stance-"stuff" that gets "passed down" from ancestors to de-
scendants or that is "shared" among them-but as informa-
tion,' 2' encourages depersonalization. Thus, as a practical
matter, members of genetic families and genetic ethnic groups
are liable to be viewed, especially by those outside the group,
less as individuals and more as reflections of a larger genetic
group.
The risks of geneticization, for both families and ethnic
groups, follow directly from the same ideological shift. That
shift encourages the view that people, individually and in
groups, can be defined by a natural substance that provides
decisive genetic information (i.e., DNA). However, the specific
ways, or not to relate to them at all. However, one cannot choose to disassociate
oneself from identification with the unit; one cannot reject inclusion within a ge-
netic family.
3" See supra notes 247-253 and accompanying text (noting Schneider's descrip-
tion of American ideology that encompasses various types of communal relation-
ships).
3" See STRATHERN, supra note 317, at 19.
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risks posed by the geneticization of family identity differ from
risks posed by the geneticization of ethnic identity. For in-
stance, genetic families face the collapse of a system of social
presumptions and legal rules that have protected privacy in
general, and confidentiality in medical settings, more particu-
larly. In contrast, members of genetic ethnic groups are espe-
cially vulnerable to the abuse of genetic data to justify old and
new prejudices about them.3
Despite these differences, the risk to each sort of group
follows from the definition of group members as effectively
indistinguishable from one another, and from the larger
whole.33' The Safer court premised Donna Safer's right to
learn about her father's medical condition on the
consubstantiality of father and daughter. The same premise is
likely to harm ethnic or racial groups, defined through genetic
information.
The proliferation of data suggesting the comparative ge-
netic homogeneity of particular American ethnic groups en-
courages members of such groups to view themselves, and
encourages outsiders to view them, as reflections of one anoth-
er and of the larger whole.33 Such a view can justify, and
thus strengthen, historic prejudices. The process actually pre-
dates the decoding of the human genome and the identification
of specific genetic alterations associated with disease, because
it has been possible for several decades to detect carriers of a
number of genetic disorders. But the likely proliferation and
increased reliance on genetic testing in the next decade inten-
sifies concern.
" Moreover, as a statistical matter, the potential medical advantages said to
justify the revelation of genetic information within family contexts are less certain
to pertain within ethnic contexts. See, e.g., Brownrigg, supra note 286, at 248
(noting potential medical benefit to children from information about a parent's
hereditary condition); Burnett, supra note 286, at 560 (noting possible therapeutic
advantages of genetic information).
"' See supra notes 260-285 and accompanying text (delineating implicit assump-
tions about genetic families in Safer v. Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, and in other texts).
"2 This vision may not be erased by other evidence, likely to be presented, that
members of human groups, defined in ethnic and racial terms, are quite similar
from a genetic perspective. See, e.g., Erhart, supra note 187. Mark Erhart is iden-
tified as a professor of molecular biology at Chicago State University.
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An early example of genetic discrimination is revealing. In
the 1970s, African-Americans were screened by the govern-
ment and private industry for the sickle-cell trait.333 As a
consequence, the United States Air Force Academy excluded
African-Americans who tested positive for the sickle-cell trait
from programs that trained pilots. The Academy feared, as it
turned out erroneously, that such people were likely to become
ill at high altitudes.3 4
At present, most genetic data presumed to describe ethnic
groups concerns genetic alterations that predispose people to
illness.133 As a result, those identified with such groups risk
being portrayed as physically marginal and potentially de-
formed. The example of the African-American cadets is reveal-
ing because it indicates that even well-intentioned policies
based on the correlation of genetic information and race (e.g.,
to protect the pilots themselves as well as those who could
suffer harm by a pilot's becoming ill during flight)336 can re-
flect institutional racism and engender new forms of discrimi-
nation.3 7 Moreover, geneticists promise soon to identify ge-
netic alterations associated with mood, intelligence, mental
illness, creativity, addiction, and character.338 Should that
happen, 39 the potential abuse of genetic information will ex-
pand exponentially.
See supra notes 186-190 and accompanying text.
See Melinda B. Kaufman, Genetic Discrimination in the Workplace: An Over-
view of Existing Protections, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 393, 403 n.71 (citing Patricia A.
King, The Past as Prologue: Race, Class, and Gene Discrimination, in GENE MAP-
PING 94, 98 (George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992)); see also Pugh, supra
note 187.
'3' See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
'36 Although the policy may have been well-intended when instituted, it was
maintained until 1981, even though by 1974 adequate evidence had accumulated to
disprove the presumed correlation between the sickle-cell trait and risk of becom-
ing ill at high altitudes. See Kaufinan, supra note 334, at 403 n.71.
' Hannah Bradby, Genetics and Racism, in THE TROUBLED HELIX: SOCIAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW HUMAN GENETICS 295, 296 (Theresa
Marteau & Martin Richards eds., 1996) (noting the difficulty of identifying racism
in cases in which "the expressed intention of the policy is not racist but the effect
is to disadvantage one or more racialized groups").
'38 NELKIN & LINDEE, supra note 49, at 9 (claiming many scientists believe ge-
netic alterations will be found for "complex, socially important human traits").
' Erica Goode, Most Ills Are a Matter of More Than One Gene, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 2000, at F1 (describing difficulty of identifying genetic alterations associ-
ated with mental illnesses).
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The hazards of society's increasing reliance on genetic
information are clear, especially for groups that have histori-
cally been subjected to social marginality and discrimination.
Genetic information, associated with groups (e.g., African-
Americans and Jews) already defined prejudicially through
reference to somatic traits, can be used to reinforce negative
images of such groups, and to construct new ones, and thus to
justify discrimination against those identified with them. Ge-
netic information, as data, is likely to be many times more
powerful as a social tool than the sort of data that was relied
upon by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German sci-
entists and physicians to justify disparaging Jews-reports, for
instance, of the flat Jewish foot."0
The stigmatizing use of genetic information to create or
reinforce dehumanizing images of ethnic groups may be harder
to protect against than the more concrete (and more frequently
noted and discussed) dangers of discrimination, especially in
institutional contexts. American law has widely prohibited
government and various private groups, such as employers,
from discriminating against people defined through reference
to somatic traits. But the legal system is far less effective at
combating stigmatization-the elaboration and communication
of prejudicial images of, or speech about, groups defined as
different from, and less adequate than, mainstream social
groups.3
41
A second, even greater danger may attend the construction
of ethnic groups defined through genetic information. This
danger could threaten even the social and legal mechanisms
that now limit social discrimination. Shifts in the understand-
ing of personhood that attend the construction of genetic fami-
lies or genetic ethnic groups could, especially if widely institu-
tionalized, portend even greater shifts in understandings of
people, and of relationships among people.
The notion of a genetic group, composed of a potentially
unlimited number of units, each defined through DNA, threat-
ens ultimately to subordinate the interests of the individual to
those of the whole. The French Indologist Louis Dumont de-
scribed that possibility to "result[] from the attempt, in a soci-
' See supra notes 236-243 and accompanying text.
34, See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
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ety where individualism is deeply rooted and predominant, to
subordinate it to the primacy of the society as a whole."342
That construction of personhood and of the relation between
people within the larger whole has been prized by theorists of
social fascism.343 In fascist theory, the individual is valuable
only as a reflection of the greater, national whole.3'
The development in America of such a view of the individ-
ual-in effect, the submersion of individual identity as the
autonomous individual is defined as isomorphic with, and is
thus displaced by, larger groups defined through reference to
genetic information-would threaten, at their core, the demo-
cratic values that now undergird virtually all efforts to protect
against discrimination based on race or ethnicity. And it could
happen, if Americans generally resolve to define ethnic groups
in genetic terms. An unmarked gene would be defined as "nor-
mal," and those who failed, in various specific ways, to conform
to the genetic map of the "normal," would be marginalized.
Neither equality nor liberty would long survive such a
reconceptualization of the social order, for it would displace
concern for the person with concern for an undifferentiated,
unmarked social whole that would, by its very terms, exclude
all those defined as genetically "Other."
CONCLUSION
The genetic family, suggested by Safer, and the genetic
ethnic group, both defined only through reference to indifferent
DNA, are constructs that exist outside of time and history.
Within both, relationships are expected to resemble the genes
342 DUMONT, supra note 250, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
"4' These theorists include Hitler and Mussolini and their "philosophical progeni-
tors" Rousseau, Fichte, and Nietzsche. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, HISTORY OF WEST-
ERN PHILOSOPHY 755 (1961); see also EBERHARD JACKEL, HITLER'S WORLD VIEW: A
BLUEPRINT FOR POWER 87 (Herbert Arnold trans., 1972) (noting that notions of
"folk" and race were central to Hitler's ideology); MARTIN GILBERT, THE EUROPEAN
POWERS 1900-1945 146 (1965) (characterizing Mussolini's fascism to have "elevated
the state to the level of a deity").
" See JACKEL, supra note 343, at 88 (explaining that "for Hitler, the bearers
and the elements of history are people and races, not--as in other views of histo-
ry-individuals, classes, cultures, or anything else" and further that for Hitler,
history was understood as "the unfolding of the struggle for life or death of peo-
ples and races, i.e., of ethnic background, not of social-economic groups").
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that define their parameters, and therefore to be essentially
amoral.
However, in contexts defined through genetic information,
as in other contexts, people continue to experience themselves
and their relationships in time and in history, and they contin-
ue, more or less intensely, to endow those relationships with
meaning and with moral value. The actual experiences of peo-
ple defined as part of groups delimited through reference to
DNA result from a vast array of cultural presumptions that
shape-and are shaped by-the construct of the genome that
defines them.345
Thus, in theory, the proliferation of genetic information
and the geneticization of identity do not inevitably portend
essential and deeply discomforting shifts in the meaning of
personhood and the scope of relationships within larger, genet-
ic groups. And in practice, many of the existing and proposed
statutes aimed at avoiding or limiting the negative consequenc-
es of the new genetics simply presume a democratic system
within which the autonomous individual remains the agent of
social action and within which the rights of that individual
must be protected.
Thus, developments in genetic information do not neces-
sarily augur the decline of democracy in American society.
They should, however, prompt due vigilance for several rea-
sons. First, as a practical matter, it may be harder to preclude
genetic discrimination and to protect genetic privacy than the
statutory structures already erected by many states, and being
proposed in the federal and state legislatures and in scores of
law review articles, might suggest. The facility with which
society can now collect and disseminate information of all sorts
broadly challenges modern notions of individual privacy. More-
over, the legislative effort to protect privacy and preclude dis-
crimination is hedged by a sense that the use of genetic infor-
mation by employers, insurers, or others may often be rational,
and thus equitable.346 Even more, American law is unlikely,
3 Kaja Finkler's EXPERIENCING THE NEW GENETICS provides a pioneering ac-
count of "the complexities [of each person's] construal of lived realities" within the
context of genetic families. FINKLER, supra note 48, at 16.
3 'See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also Mary Terrell White, Un-
derlying Ambiguities in Genetic Privacy Legislation, 3 GENET. TEST. 341, 344
(1999).
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and as presently constituted largely unable, to dispel stigma-
tizing, dehumanizing images of groups defined through a
mapped genome.
These practical concerns intensify when the genetic group
is considered as an aspect of the ideology of genetic inheri-
tance. The depersonalization implied by the notion of a genetic
group abets the development of stigmatizing images, even
when malicious intention is absent. Similarly, and even more
important, the genetic group, as social construct, expressly
displaces the individual as the agent of social action and as the
unit of social value with the larger, unstructured, essentially
amoral whole. That construct, widely validated, would under-
mine the very idea of privacy or equality as valuable, and
could thus disrupt or completely halt efforts to protect privacy
and to preclude or limit genetic discrimination.
In short, the decoding of the human genome and the prolif-
eration of genetic information constitute a serious challenge to
existing understandings of personhood and of the scope of
relationships among people within groups defined through
DNA. How society responds to that challenge will significantly
affect the social order within which the consequences of the
"new genetics" will unfold.
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